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INTRODUCTION

The current paper will examine the structure of
mood (emotional levels which endure over time} and its
relation to the structure of personality.

Two models, one

of mood and one of personality, will be explored in depth
and compared.

However, before I present in more detail the

focus this work will take, I would like to present two
rather broad conceptual notions which serve as the backdrop
for the major hypotheses of this study.
Scarr (1985}, in her recent article entitled
Constructing Psychology: Making facts and fables for our
time, noted that the field of psychology has a distinct
preference for focusing on proximal rather than distal
variables when examining human behavior.

Proximal vari-

ables are those that are temporally near to the variable
being measured (ie. mood states as a function of· the day's
events}.

Distal variables, on the other hand, are those

that occur or exert their influence from a point well
removed from the variable under study and are usually of a
sociological or genetic nature (ie. personality or intelligence variables that show a high heritability}.

She argued

that because distal variables have temporal priority over
proximal variables, their inclusion into psychological
research can add clarity to an area that is often clouded
1
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by correlational analyses of proximal variables.

In sup-

port of her assertions, Scarr presented evidence from an
analysis of the IQ's, communication skills, and social
adjustments of children.

In each case the proximal predic-

tor variables that contributed to these childhood measures
were the amount of positive discipline and positive control
that mothers were observed giving to their children.

Those

mothers who interacted more positively with their children
had brighter, more communicative, and more socially adjusted children.

This was a plausible and seemingly straight-

forward finding.

However, when Scarr analyzed the data on

childhood functioning with the inclusion of distal predictor variables, the picture that emerged was very different.
It was found in every instance that the mothers' intelligence (estimated by WAIS vocabulary scale scores) became
the most significant predictor of the childhood measures.
In all cases the mothers' intelligence was the variable
that mediated "positive mothering" and, in almost all
instances, the inclusion of the distal variable wiped out
the significant association that had been observed between
the proximal variables and the dependent measures.
Her argument was that researchers wear the "blinders of their cultural time period", and that in the current
time period vision is focused most exclusively onto
proximal variables so that the contribution of distal
variables (like those above) often go unnoticed.

3

On a further conceptual note, Millon (1981), in his
review of the history of personality theories, described

.

how many researchers and theorists "discovered'' ideas that
were in fact very similar to ideas proposed by theorists
from an earlier era, theorists from a different perspective, or even theorists from a different segment of the
vast psychological literature.
and unintended.

This is often unavoidable

However, it is unfortunate how often these

similarities go unnoticed, leading to unnecessary debate
over concepts that are very similar, but which go by
deceptively dissimilar names.
In the current paper attention will be focused on
research that examines the structure of emotional experience and it will be seen that the thoughts of Scarr and
Millon have application in this realm.

The 1980's have

been referred to as the decade of affect (Tomkins, 1981),
and research within this domain has proliferated on many
fronts.

For example, significant research has been

conducted on the influence of affect on cognitive process-

ing (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984), the affective correlates of
personality traits (Costa & McCrea, 1980, 1984; Mehrabian,
1980; Plutchik,1980), the discrete components of emotional
experience (Izard, 1972, 1977; Plutchik, 1962, 1980), the
broad structure of affect found in ratings of facial
expressions (e.g. Abelson & Sermat, 1962; Cliff & Young,
1968; Green & Cliff, 1975), and the broad structure of

4

affect found in ratings of self-reported mood (e.g. Diener

& Emmons, 1984; Russell, 1978, 1979; Watson & Clark, 1984;
Watson & Tellegen, 1985}.
It is the last category, that of self-reported
mood, that has remained the most disarrayed.

Only recently

have researchers begun to outline the broadest dimensions
of affective structure and approach a consensus.

Prior to

this work (Russell, 1978, 1979; Watson and Tellegen, 1985}
various researchers had proposed that anywhere from four to
12 factors were necessary to define the structure of affect
(e.g., Borgatta, 1961; Hendrick & Lilly, 1970; Izard, 1972:
Lorr, Datson & Smith, 1967; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman,
1971; Nowlis, 1965; Thayer, 1967; Watson & Tellegen, 1985}.
The above research, which has looked for and found many
emotional factors, has generally sought a fine grained
analysis of emotional experience in order to accurately
define the discrete components of mood variation.

Within

this realm of analysis, confusion over the number, or the
exact nature, of discrete emotional factors still remains.
In contrast to this confusion, the area of greatest
disagreement within two-factor models of affect concerns
the proper rotation of dimensions within a factor analytic
solution.

Two-factor models of affect seek to define the

broadest aspects of emotional variation, and within a twofactor solution, there is not an a Qriori correct rotation.
Rather, the most sensible rotation is found from the

5

differential pattern of correlates that correspond to the
dimensions extracted (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1984;
watson and Tellegen, 1985).
The most promising two-factor model has been one
where the broad dimensions of positive affect and negative
affect have been delineated.

These dimensions have been

shown to be independent of each other over time (Bradburn,
1969; Harding, 1982; Warr, Barter, and Brownbridge, 1983),
with each dimension showing distinct patterns of association with other measures of personality (Costa and McCrea,
1980, 1984) and well-being (Bradburn, 1969).
Watson and Tellegen (1985) have recently begun to
systematize and explicate the dimensions of positive affect
and negative affect.

Extensive evidence has been presented

which delineates the importance of these two particular
dimensions (e.g., Watson and Clark, 1984).

They have been

shown to have cross cultural stability (Watson, Clark, and
Tellegen, 1984), and it has been shown that these two
dimensions of affect emerge in both nomothetic factor
analytic studies of a large numbers of subjects, and
idiographic factor analytic studies of fewer subjects
assessed repeatedly over time.
The research conducted by Watson and Tellegen
resulted in the model of affective structure depicted in
Figure 1.

Within this model, the dimension of Negative

Affect is characterized by emotional distress, fear,

6

Figure 1. The structure of emotional experience proposed by watson and
Tellegen (1985), showing the major dimensions of Positive Affect
(horizontal) and Negative Affect (vertical) am their relationship to
the dimenSions of pleasantness am arousal ( ~t) . Adapted fran
watson and Tellegen (1985).
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nervousness, and hostility at the high end, and the experience of a calm, relaxed serenity at the low end.

Positive

Affect, on the other hand is characterized by feelings of
elation, excitement, and enthusiasm on the high end, and
the experience of sluggishness or fatigue on the low end.
The dashed lines on the diagonals in Figure 1 represent an
alternative two-factor solution, and are conceptualized
within the current model to represent combinations of the
dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect.
Despite the advances that have been had through the
development of this two-factor model of affect, the thesis
of the present study is that this model is incomplete in
its particulars.

Research on this model is relatively new

and the same methods of factor analysis have often resulted
in the extraction of Positive and Negative Affect factors
which show slightly different terms defining the major
dimensions.

Conceptually, the factors that emerge in any

particular sample can be seen as proximal variables because
connections to broad sources of variation which may mediate
the observed relationship between terms has not been made.
Numerous researchers have declared that more work is needed
in order to further elucidate what gives rise to these

dimensions (e.g., Diener and Emmons, 1984; Watson and
Clark, 1984; Watson, Clark, and Tellegen, 1984), and it is
argued here that an important conceptual link has been
overlooked in this process.

It is believed that this
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conceptual link will further elucidate what gives rise to
these dimensions, and that there will be greater clarity
over the precise nature of affective structure when the
connection is made.
It is suggested that the model of affective
structure presented in Figure 1 is "rediscovering'' dimensions of individual differences that were delineated many
years ago and that have already been extensively analyzed.
Specifically, it is proposed that this two-factor model of
affect may be describing, via emotional descriptors, the
personality dimensions of introversion-extraversion (E) and
neuroticism-stability (N) which have been outlined by Hans
Eysenck over the past 30 years.

Specifically, the

dimension of Positive Affect is believed to be equivalent
to the dimension of introversion-extraversion and the
dimension of Negative Affect is believed to be equivalent
to the dimension of neuroticism-stability.
In addition to exploring how the model of affect
presented in Figure 1 may be "rediscovering'' the dimensions
outlined earlier by Eysenck, it will be argued that the E
and N dimensions of
distal variables.

~ersonality

fit Scarr's definition of

That is, these dimensions have been

shown to be strongly influenced by genetic factors (Eaves
and Eysenck, 1985), have strong longitudinal consistency
(Conley, 1985), and show stability across all of the 26
countries where cross cultural consistency has been
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assessed (Barrett and Eysenck, 1984; Eysenck, Barrett,
Spielberger, Evans, & Eysenck, 1986).

As distal variables

the E and N dimensions of personality will be included in
an analysis of emotional structure.

It is proposed that

the inclusion of these dimensions will then help to clarify
the exact nature of the dominant dimensions of emotional
experience.
This current paper begins with a selective historical review of the literature that deals with self-reported
affect.

This review culminates with a discussion of the

major two-factor models of affective structure.

Following

this is a review of the E and N dimensions of personality.
Next, research evidence which indicates the convergence of
extraversion/Positive Affect and neuroticism/Negative
Affect is presented.

This review then culminates with a

statement of the hypotheses for the present analysis.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

AFFECTIVE STRUCTURE
As noted in the introduction, there has been a
marked difference between studies that have analyzed selfreport data and studies that have analyzed non-self-report
data.

Research on non-self-report data has included

analyses of vocal and facial expressions of emotion (e.g.,
Abelson & Sermat, 1962; Cliff & Young, 1968; Green & Cliff,
1975; Russell & Bullock, 1985; Schlosberg, 1952), semantic
differential ratings of mood terms (Averill, 1975; Block,
1957), and judged similarities among mood words (Bush,
1973, Russell, 1980, 1983).

In almost all cases, this

literature has discovered that two large bipolar dimensions
of mood adequately describe the observed relationships.
Invariably these dimensions have been a pleasure-displeasure dimension and an arousal-sleepy dimension.

At times a

small and variously named (ie. potency, dominance, aggression or affection-rejection) third dimension has emerged
from these studies as well (see Russell & Mehrabian, 1977),
but this dimension, unlike the others, has not been readily
replicated across studies or cultures (Russell, 1978,
1983).
Historically, studies of self-rated affect have
been less clear, less interpretable, and less consistent
than the studies mentioned above.
10

As will be discussed
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below, various authors have claimed that between four and
12 independent, monopolar factors are necessary to describe
emotional structure.

However, in recent years, methodo-

·logical corrections have been made and an approach to

consensus is becoming apparent.

More recent investigations

on self-reported affect have discovered that when response
biases are corrected and an adequate, representative sample
of mood terms are used, two broad bipolar dimensions emerge
from the self-report data.

Despite this approach to

consensus, there is disagreement over what constitutes the
two most basic dimensions of affect.
The two dominant researchers of the two-dimensional
structure of self-reported affect are Russell (1978, 1979;
Russell & Ridgeway, 1983), who argues that the two basic
dimensions of affect are degree of arousal and degree of
pleasure; and Watson and his colleagues (Watson & Clark,
1984; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1984; Watson & Tellegen,
1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982), who argue that the two
broadest dimensions are Positive Affect and Negative
Affect.
As a side note, some recent research has proposed a
circumplex model of affective structure (see Conte &
Plutchik, 1981; Daly, Lancee & Polivy, 1983; Fisher, Heise,
Bohrnstedt, & Lucke, 1985; Russell, 1980, 1983; Russell &
Bullock, 1985).

According to this model, affect terms are

arranged in an ordered fashion around a circle in two-

12
dimensional space.

In this model the dimensions that are

initially used to place terms in this circular space are
deemed unimportant because the order and spacing of the
terms on the circle defines their structure and "any
particular axis is arbitrary and no more basic than any
other" (Conte & Plutchik, 1981, p.70).

This type of model

is not as well researched as the dimensional models, and it
is used generally as an indicator of the conceptual

relationship between affect terms.

Additionally, these

researchers disregard the dimensional aspects of their data
- which are essential to the hypotheses of this study.

For

these reasons, circumplex models of affect will not be
considered here.

Rather, an overview of early self-report

research will be presented.

Following that, a more

detailed examination of the two-dimensional models put
forth by Russell and by Watson will be conducted.
Before beginning with a review of early affect
research, however, it is important to note that the twodimensional models to be discussed, which are characterized
by a small number of broad factors, are not inconsistent
with the body of research that deals with more discrete
emotional factors, which are characterized by a large
number of narrow dimensions (see Bartlett & Izard, 1972;
Watson & Tellegen, 1985).

In fact, the discrete, unipolar

emotions converge on the bipolar two-dimensional structure
in a second order factor analysis (much like all of
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Cattell's 16 Personality Factors load on Eysenck's two
dimensions of introversion-extraversion and neuroticismstability after a second order factor analysis).

Early Research
Pioneering work on the factor analytic study of
self-reported mood began in the 1950's with Nowlis (Nowlis

& Nowlis, 1956) when he developed the Mood Adjective Check
List.

Nowlis began his work by hypothesizing that four

bipolar dimensions (pleasantness-unpleasantness, activation-deactivation, positive-negative social orientation,
and control-lack of control) would characterize mood
structure.

He gathered adjectives to measure each hypothe-

sized dimension and in a series of factor analytic studies
(e.g. Green & Nowlis, 1957), found, much to his surprise,
that the hypothesized bipolar dimensions tended to separate
and form more discrete unipolar factors.

This research

finding, contrary to expectation, indicated that one could
experience emotion along any one of these factors independently.
Subsequently, Nowlis (1965) reviewed 15 factor
analytic studies of mood and found six unipolar factors
which emerged in nearly every study.

He considered these

"sure'' factors of affect structure.

In addition, he found

that another six unipolar factors emerged with some
regularity across studies.

Accordingly, he thought these

14
could be considered ''tentative" independent factors.

The

six primary factors apparent in almost all studies were
labeled aggression, anxiety, surgency, concentration,
fatigue, and social affection.
Following the initial work of Nowlis, Borgatta
(1961} confirmed the existence of these six "sure'' unipolar
factors in a self-report study.

This study was seen and

used as a validation of the earlier work done by Nowlis and
it included the same response format proposed by Nowlis and
his associates (Green & Nowlis, 1957; Nowlis & Nowlis,
1956).

The response format consisted of a four point

rating scale after each term (see Table 1).

Subjects

indicated one of the three options to denote how the affect
term best described their current mood, or they indicated

"?" which meant that they could not decide, or that the
term did not apply to the way they were feeling.

The use

of this format becomes an important issue in determining
factor structure and will be discussed more fully below.
It is worth noting that in four of the six factors
extracted by Borgatta, there were terms that loaded
oppositely on the factor.

This bipolarity was disregarded

however, because these loadings were not as high (though in
the .5 range} as were the loadings for terms that Borgatta
subsequently used to develop factor scales.
During the 1960's Lorr and McNair began developing
and validating their Profile Of Moods States (Lorr, Datson

15

Table 1. The different response formats used by researcher's studying self-reported affect.

---------------------------------------------------------Response format proposed by Nowlis (1965)
Response

Interpretation

vv
v

I definitely feel .....
I feel slightly .......
I cannot decide .......
or term does not apply ...
I am definitely not ...

?

no

Score
4 points
3 points
2 points

1 point

Response format proposed by McNair & Lorr (1964)
Response

Interpretation

Score

extremely
I feel extremely.......
3 points
quite a bit
I feel quite a bit.....
2 points
a little
I feel a little........
1 point
not at all
I don't feel at all....
0 points
(The response "moderately" was also included in their later
studies and was given the score of 2 points while the
response "quite a bit" was scored 3 points and "extremely"
was scored 4 points.)

Response format proposed by Meddis (1972)
Response
vv
v
X
XX

Interpretation
I
I
I
I

definitely feel . . . . . . . . . .
feel slightly ............
do not feel . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
definitely do not feel ...

Score
4
3
2
1

points
points
points
point
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& Smith, 1967; Lorr, McNair, Weinstein, Michaux & Raskin,
1961; McNair & Lorr, 1964; McNair, Lorr & Droppleman, 1971;
POMS - originally called the Psychiatric Outpatient Mood
scales).

These researchers initially found six replicable

unipolar mood factors: tension, anxiety, anger, depression,
vigor, and fatigue; and later found evidence for two
additional unipolar factors: friendliness and confusion.
These factors, taken together, include the dimensions
proposed by Nowlis (Nowlis and Nowlis, 1956) and later
confirmed by Borgatta (1961).
The final version of the POMS had factorial derived,
unipolar scales measuring tension, anger-hostility,
fatigue, depression, confusion, friendliness, elation, and
vigor.

The response format used by Lorr and his colleagues

(see Table 1) was different from that used by Nowlis and by
Borgatta in that it did not have the "?'' response option.
However, as will be discussed below, this response format
also "pulls" for the extraction of unipolar rather than
bipolar factors.
Thayer (1967), using arousal theory as his theoretical
base (see Duffy, 1962; Malmo, 1959), set out to measure
what he considered to be a large, bipolar, emotional factor
of activation.

Employing the same response format as

Nowlis (1965), he found that rather than one large bipolar
dimension, four predominantly unipolar factors emerged in
his orthogonal rotation.

He termed the four factors as

17

follows: 1) General Activation, which is comprised of the
terms full-of-pep, active, vigorous, energetic, lively,
peppy and activated; 2) Deactivation-Sleep, which is
comprised of the terms drowsy, sleepy, tired, wide-awake
(recoded), and wakeful (recoded);

3) High Activation,

which is comprised of the terms tense, jittery, stirred-up,
clutched-up, intense, anxious, and fearful; and 4) General
Deactivation, which is comprised of the terms placid,
leisurely, at-rest, quiescent, calm, still, and quiet.
Again it seemed that common-sense notions of affect
were incorrect.

Factor analysis had shown over the course

of a decade of research that happiness was not the opposite
of sadness, anger-hostility was not the opposite of
friendliness, and a state of arousal was not the opposite
of a state of sleepiness.

Rather, it appeared that the

evidence was consistently in favor of a large number of
discrete emotional states which could vary independently of
each other.
In 1969, Bradburn published his monograph The Structure of Psychological Well-Being.

In both his pilot work

and in his nationwide, cross-sectional sample of respondents, he discovered that two dimensions of affect,
positive affect and negative affect, were uncorrelated with
each other, and that each dimension correlated independently with other indices of well-being.

Both measures

were unipolar scales, in the tradition of previous research
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(see Appendix A for a complete list of the questions that
make up each scale).

Commenting on the observed indepen-

dence of these two scales, Bradburn said:
within a given period of time, such as a week or two,
one may experience many different emotions, both
positive and negative, and that in general there is no
tendency for the two types to be experienced in any
particular relation to one another. This lack of
correlation means that information about the extent of
positive feelings a person has experienced in the
recent past does not give us any information on the
extent of his negative feelings (1969, p.225).
It was found that negative affect correlated
positively with indices of the number of things people
worried about, the intensity with which people worried
about these things, the number of physical symptoms
reported in the past few weeks, psychological anxiety, and
whether or not the respondent had worried about having a
"nervous breakdown".

Positive affect was uncorrelated with

these measures but was positively correlated to indices of
sociability and experiences of novelty.

It was interesting

that the only demographic index that correlated to any
degree with these scales was Socio-Economic Status (SES)
which had a slight correlation with positive affect.
Bradburn contended that SES was related to positive affect
by the fact that people with a higher SES live in a "social
opportunity structure ... {which) would facilitate their
having the kinds of experiences that are associated with
higher positive affect (1969, p. 227)."

As indicated

above, Bradburn's analyses found that negative affect was
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uncorrelated with the indices that correlated to positive
affect, and positive affect was independent from negative
affect and the indices which correlated with negative
affect.
It was further found that the best index of
psychological well-being came through the subtraction of
negative affect from positive affect.

Bradburn termed this

index the Affect Balance Scale and it indicated that wellbeing was the degree to which positive affective feelings
surpassed negative affective feelings over time.
Bradburn's work was significant for several
reasons.

First, this was the initial work to measure

affect on a nationwide scale, rather than with a relatively
small sample of students or patients.

Second, he clarified

that these two dimensions had differential and independent
relations with other life experiences.

Third, even though

his analysis used two independent scales which sound
deceptively similar to Watson's proposed bipolar dimensions
(Watson & Tellegen, 1985}, they were unipolar scales and
were seen as further support for the validity of all
unipolar factors of emotions.
There is an important issue that needs to be
focused further at this point.

There is a difference

between a small number of broad factors varying independently and a large number of discrete factors varying independently.

Bradburn found support for the former (two
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factors: positive and negative affect, which are independent of each other over time).

Unfortunately, however,

because he used unipolar scales, because of the scientific
zeitgeist of the time, and because semantically (or by
common sense) positive affect should be the opposite of
negative affect and this was found not to be the case, his
work could easily be seen as further support for the latter

(i.e., a large number of unipolar scales that operated
independently).

Bradburn had begun to clarify affective

structure by discovering the independent correlates of his
two scales, but had also clouded research by unintentionally fostering the impression that all emotional factors
were unipolar.

As will be seen later, continued support

has been found for the independence of two broad factors of
affect; but this result has not been found for discrete
unipolar factors.

Instead, these factors have tended to

converge into a smaller number of broad bipolar factors.
Returning to analyses of discrete emotions,
Hendrick and Lilly (1970) attempted to validate the six
"sure" and six "tentative" monopolar factors found earlier
by Nowlis (1965).

In addition, they made the first attempt

to replicate factors under two different conditions: a
normal wakefulness and a sleep deprived condition.

They

reported only fair factor congruence between the two
conditions.

This was not unexpected, given that the

structure they attempted to replicate was composed of a
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large number of narrowly defined factors.

Additionally, it

was very likely that they employed an unstable correlation
matrix for the factor analysis of the sleep deprived group,
as there were only 62 subjects under this condition and
they were assessing the intercorrelations among 44 terms.
More pertinent to the present discussion, was the
fact that Hendrick and Lilly attempted to directly compare
two different response formats in their control condition.
For 126 subjects they used the format developed by Nowlis
(see Table 1) and for 135 subjects they used their own
format which consisted of a nine point rating scale placed
below each emotion term and anchored by "very much" on one
end and "not at all" on the other end.

These authors

extracted 10 factors under each response format, eight of
which they considered interpretable.

They considered all

factors to be unipolar, except for a fatigue-activation
bipolar factor (their fourth factor).

This interpretation

was retained even though their first two factors both have
items that loaded oppositely on the factor in the .5 range.
Given the number of subjects that were used, a loading of
.5 was likely a significant loading, however they provided
no indication that this was the case.
When comparing response formats, they reported
factor congruence coefficients ranging from .65 to .96 (p.
456) across factors under each condition.

To assess their

results, they used a "general rule of thumb" which was that
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coefficients above .75 reflected a "good fit".

They

contended that their findings demonstrated "a high degree
of congruence between the two types of scales in the factor
structure that emerged.

Such results provide(d) evidence

for the generality of the factor structures across variation in scale type (p. 456)".

The observed similarity

across response styles may reflect one of two possibilities.

First, their response format was not well described

and it may have been a continuum rating, like the one used
by Lorr and McNair (see Table 1).

If this was the case, a

large number of monopolar factors would still be expected,
and they would not be expected to differ much from the
factors observed under the Nowlis format (within the
constraints of the adjective sampling pool, of course).

A

second possibility was that the congruence coefficients, of
which Hendrick and Lilly state not much was known, give an
overly generous estimate of factor congruence.

In either

case, this was the last time in the reported literature
that response style has not greatly affected the outcome of
factor analytic solutions to self-reported mood.
It is important to note that at this point it was
an established "fact" that emotional experience was
comprised of discrete, unipolar factors.

This seemed to be

true regardless of the response format that was used to
assess mood.

Many theories of discrete emotions developed

from this climate (i.e. Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1972, 1977;
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plutchik, 1962, 1980), and it is not the purpose of this
study to detract from these theories, as they do have
viability.

Rather, this is pointed out because after this

point in the history of emotional research, response format
began to become a more important determinant of factor
structure.
Meddis (1972) began to examine the influence of
response format on the factor structure of self-rated mood
when he was working on his doctoral dissertation and
repeatedly failed to find results that were similar to
previous research.

Meddis realized that he was using a

symmetrical response format (see Table 1), where there are
as many categories for rejection as there are for acceptance, while others were not.

He noted of the Nowlis

response format two problems:
firstly, the query category will present scoring
difficulties.
If we give one point to 'no', two points
to'?', three points to 'v', etc., we have the problem
of justifying the scale as ordinal ... Secondly, the
scale is not symmetrical; we have two categories of
acceptance but only one category of rejection (p. 180).
The latter criticism of asymmetry can be applied equally
well to the response format of Lorr and McNair, and.
probably to that of Hendrick and Lilly.
In assessing the effect of a symmetrical response
format compared to the format of Nowlis, Meddis carried out
three analyses.

In the first analysis, he discovered that

the Nowlis format resulted in more nonsignificant correlations among terms, and that it selectively depressed
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negative correlations.

Thus, the Nowlis format inappropri-

atelY gave the impression that adjectives which were
broadly opposite in meaning did not correlate negatively
with each other.
In his second analysis, Meddis factor analyzed
(principal components with a Varimax rotation) terms very
similar to those used by Thayer (1967).

As mentioned

above, Thayer was expecting to find a large bipolar factor
of emotion that followed the hypotheses of arousal theory,
but instead found four smaller monopolar factors.

Using

the Nowlis format (which Thayer also used), Meddis extracted five almost exclusively monopolar factors, of which the
first four are equivalent to those discovered by Thayer.
However, when using his own response format, Meddis
extracted two large bipolar factors and a smaller unipolar
factor.

The first two factors under this format were in

fact a bipolar combination of Thayer's earlier factors.
Thayer's factors of 'General Activation' and 'Deactivation
Sleep' merged to form a single bipolar factor.

Similarly,

the originally monopolar factors of 'High Activation' and
'General Deactivation' merged to form a large bipolar
factor.

These large bipolar factors (see Table 2) show a

strong similarity to the factors of Positive Affect and
Negative Affect proposed by Watson and Tellegen (1985) to
be the major dimensions of affective structure (compare
Table 2 with Figure 1).
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Table 2.
The first two factors found by Meddis in the
reanalysis of Thayer's hypotheses. Taken from Meddis
(1972).

Factor 1
alert
sleepy
lively
wide-awake
drowsy
concentrating
tired
active
vigorous
sluggish
warm-hearted

Factor 2
.83
-.74
.71
.71
-.70
.68
-.66
.59
.53
-.51
.51

leisurely
carefree
nonchalant
jittery
calm
clutched-up

.72
.65
.62
-.60
.56
-.53
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In his final analysis, Meddis reanalyzed the
hypotheses of Green and Nowlis (1967).

It may be recalled

that Green and Nowlis originally hypothesized four bipolar
factors, and were surprised when instead they found a
larger number of predominantly unipolar factors.

Using a

symmetrical response format, Meddis again found bipolar
factors emerged from the data, while under the Nowlis
format unipolar factors emerged.
Spurred on by the work of Meddis, a number of
researchers that had previously found factor analytic
support for unipolar emotional factors have reanalyzed
their own measures.

Thayer (1978) found that when he did

not impose an orthogonal solution on his data, his four
monopolar factors formed two negatively correlated factors
in an oblique rotation.

Like Meddis (1972), Thayer found

that 'High Activation' and 'General Deactivation' correlated negatively, as did 'General Activation' and
'Deactivation-Sleep'.

In addition, these two pairs of

factors each formed a distinct bipolar factor in a second
order factor analysis.

Though this result was not due to

response format, it does support a model of affect, like
that presented in Figure 1, that is characterized by fewer,
more robust factors.
Lorr and his colleagues (Lorr, McNair & Fisher,
1982; Lorr & Shea, 1979) have also reanalyzed the factor
structure in their Profile of Mood States (McNair, Lorr &
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oroppleman, 1971; POMS).

As mentioned previously, this is

a frequently used measure of affective experience that
yields scores on eight monopolar scales.

Their original

response format, while not including the '?' option used by
Nowlis, was asymmetrical (see Table 1).

When they used a

balanced response format (Lorr & Shea, 1979) or when they
partialed out response bias (Lorr, McNair & Fisher, 1982),
a smaller number of more robust and predominantly bipolar
factors emerged.

In each instance the largest factors were

bipolar, while some of the smaller factors were monopolar.
The authors do not comment on what this fact may imply for
their published questionnaire (POMS), but it is clear that
a biased response format will contaminate a factor structure that is broad and bipolar.
Russell (1979) has also tested some of Meddis'
hypotheses.

He found, in a comparison of the Nowlis

(1965), McNair and Lorr (1964), Meddis (1972), and a truefalse response format, that the Meddis format was least
subject to the effects of response bias.

Current Two-Factor Models

3. A. Russell is an often cited and fairly prolific
researcher of affective structure.

Since his theory of

affective structure has changed over time, an overview of

his work will be presented.

Additionally, critical

comments will be made where they are appropriate to the
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goals of the present research.

His first work on affect

was done in collaboration with Albert Mehrabian (Mehrabian

& Russell, 1974) and resulted in a book that was based on a
series of studies of affective experience.

Their theoret-

ical starting point was to apply the dimensions found with
Osgood's (1966) semantic differential to emotional experience.

They believed that three dimensions (pleasantness-

unpleasantness, arousal-sleepiness, and dominance-submissiveness) would be found in research on affect, and that
these dimensions would be analogous to the dimensions of
evaluation, activity, and potency, which had been found in
a wide variety of studies which employed the semantic
differential (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Snider &
Osgood, 1969).
In their first work (1974), factor analytic scales
that directly corresponded to their three proposed factors
were developed.

Later (Russell & Mehrabian, 1977), they

reported that their previously developed scales of pleasantness, arousal, and dominance accounted for almost all of
the replicable variance in 42 scales of emotion developed
by other authors (e.g. Izard, 1972; Johnson & Myers, 1967;
McNair & Lorr, 1964; Nowlis, 1965; Spielberger, Gorsuch &
Lushene, 1970; Thayer, 1967; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965).

In

addition, they presented beta weights which showed how each
of the other 42 scales could be predicted solely from their
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three dimensions, and a measure of acquiescence response
bias.
Clearly, it would be an impressive finding if a11
published measures of emotion could be adequately predicted
by just three scales.

However, a close examination of the

process they followed in scale construction leaves questions over the claimed superiority of their dimensions.

To

develop their emotion scales (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974),
they had students rate story vignettes for emotional
quality.

There is no problem with this procedure in

itself; however, the scales which ratings were made upon
were developed on primarily a priori grounds, rather than
from experimental evidence.

Since they hypothesized three

dimensions upon which emotion should vary, they proceeded
to list pairs of terms that they believed would be contrasts along the dimension of interest.

For example,

one

item on the Pleasure scale is anchored by "happy" on the
left, followed by a line with nine spots where a subject
can make a check mark and then anchored on the right by
"unhappy".

In the final form of their measure there were

six similar item pairs for each of the three dimensions of
pleasure, arousal and dominance.

For each story vignette

subjects were requested to mark how they felt along the
continuum between the two anchor terms.

Scores along these

continua were then factored by means of a principal
components analysis.
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There would not be a problem with this procedure if
the item pairs were derived through factor analysis or even
by means of intercorrelations from a separate sample.
However, the item pairs were not, and the authors' presented no evidence which demonstrated that their item pairs
actually fall at opposite ends of an emotional continuum.
The confused nature of this process is apparent when we see
that as part of the Pleasure scale the word pair "relaxed
vs. bored" appears.

However, as part of the Arousal scale,

the word pair "relaxed vs. stimulated" appears (p. 216).
Is "relaxed" a marker of Pleasure or a marker of Arousal?
Other questionable word pairs which they believed represented a continuum were "contented vs. melancholic"
(Pleasure scale), "jittery vs. dull" (Arousal scale), "in
control vs. cared for", and "important vs. awed" (both on
the Dominance scale).

The supposed continua between these

word pairs are not readily evident.

Further, the haphazard

pairing of words which anchor their continua throws doubt
on the validity of the entire measure.
In a later study, Russell (1978) employed the above
scales and reconfirmed the importance of Pleasure and
Arousal as dimensions of affect.

In this study he did not

find further support for the dimension of Dominance.
However, a number of years later (Russell & Steiger, 1982)
he again reasserted the importance of this scale.

In the

1978 study, he had subjects rate emotional terms on the

31
semantic differential-like scales described above.

Then,

by means of a multidimensional scaling technique, extracted
three dimensions along which all terms varied.

These

dimensions were his original three hypothesized dimensions.
He then compared the scaling dimensions from his study to
the scaling dimensions found by Bush (1972, 1973} and the
three semantic differential dimensions found by Averill
(1975) in their studies of mood term similarities.

Compar-

isons were made by canonical correlations and the results
showed strong support for the dimensions of pleasure and
arousal across studies, but there was no clear convergence
for the third dimension.

In this same study Russell

reported the results of a principal components analysis
done on 11 scales (not items} that were shared across
studies.

This analysis resulted in a two-dimensional

solution.

The two dimensions, consistent with the canoni-

cal correlations, were interpreted as Pleasure and Arousal.
The last analysis is discussed because it is easy
to get the impression from reading Russell's abstracts,
summaries or discussions that he has performed a number of
factor analytic studies on emotional terms (Mehrabian &
Russell, 1974; Russell, 1978, 1979, 1980).

However, there

is only one analysis, within one larger study, where factor
analytic results for individual terms are reported.

In all

other cases his reported results are on the factoring of a
number of scales, rather than items.

In the one case where
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a principal components analysis was conducted on individual
items, Russell and Ridgeway (1983) presented the results of
an analysis conducted on self-reported affect in two
samples of children.

Initially, for each sample a large

factor upon which all items loaded was removed from the
analysis.

This factor was considered a response bias

factor, and was thrown out.

However, no evidence was

presented to indicate that this was the only meaningful
interpretation for this factor.

After the first factor was

disposed of, it was found in the first sample of children
that none of the emotion terms adequately described the
second factor.

Nevertheless, this factor was retained on a

Qriori grounds, and was later discussed as if it lent
experimental support for their two-factor (Arousal and
Domminance) model of affect.

In their second sample of

children, terms did load on the second factor of their
extraction.

However, the argument that the dominant

dimensions of affect in a principal components analysis of
self-reported mood were Pleasantness and Arousal was not
entirely convincing.
In sum, Russell's methodology, seen in both his
original analyses with Mehrabian and in his later work with
Ridgeway, appears to be on shaky ground and calls into
question the interpretations that he makes regarding the
nature of affective structure.
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This extended discussion and critique of Russell's
work has been done primarily because his two-dimensional
structure is in contrast to that of Watson and his colleagues (Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson, Clark & Tellegen,
1984; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Zevon & Tellegen, 1982).
These latter researchers present considerable evidence that
the main dimensions of affective structure within a twodimensional model are in fact at a 45 degree rotation to
the dimensions proposed by Russell.

It may be that both

models are valid, but alternative, two-factor solutions to
the same pattern of correlations among emotional terms; as
Russell primarily uses scaling techniques (as have other
researchers on the dimensions of vocal and facial expression) while Watson and his colleagues rely on the first two
main dimensions that emerge from factor analysis (rotated
to orthogonal simple structure).

However, Russell's

dimensions may differ from those found by Watson and
Tellegen, at least in part, because of the methodological
questions raised above.
In either case, Watson and Tellegen (1985) contend
that Russell's dimensions will emerge as the first two
factors in an unrotated principal components analysis of
self-rated mood.

Alternatively, Russell's dimensions may

be seen in a two-factor, orthogonal factor analysis of
emotion items by noting the terms that load highly on both
Positive and Negative Affect.

These are the terms which

!'
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fall on the diagonals in Figure 1.

It is interesting to

note that a similar controversy regarding the appropriate
rotation of factors in a two-factor space has emerged in
the field of personality (which we will discuss more fully
later).

Briefly, Gray (1981) has argued that the dominant

dimensions of personality are impulsivity and anxiety.

He

believes that these dimensions lie at a 45 or 47 degree
rotation to Eysenck's (1981; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985) well
documented dimensions of introversion-extraversion and
neuroticism-stability.

The debate over proper rotational

solutions in either one of these areas will not be settled
(or even addressed directly) by this study, but the
similarity of arguments is apparent.
We will turn now to a more detailed discussion of
the dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect as put forth
by Watson and Tellegen (1985).

These authors, building on

earlier work (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1984; Zevon &
Tellegen, 1982) that utilized both intraindividual P-type
factor analysis (Cattell, 1952) and traditional across
subject R-type factor analysis, put forth the model
depicted in Figure 1.
In support of this structure, six of the previously
published studies that had argued for a large number of
discrete emotional factors (Borgatta, 1961; Hendrick &
Lilly, 1970; Lebo & Nesselroade, 1978; McNair et al., 1971;
Russell & Ridgeway, 1983; Thayer, 1967) were reanalyzed.
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It was the contention of Watson and Tellegen (1985) that
there were several reasons for confusion over the basic
factors of emotional experience.

They stated:

many self-report studies have a number of methodological problems and biases including poor sampling of
affect terms, improper response formats, and acquiescence response bias that attenuate the normally high
negative correlations between opposite mood terms, and
so preclude the emergence of large bipolar dimensions
.... our analyses bear out the critical importance of
an additional factor for understanding study outcomes,
namely the chosen method of analysis.
Investigators of
self-rated mood have generally used factor analysis and
have used ... (the] Kaiser criterion (which retains all
principal components with eigenvalues of 1.00 or
greater) (and] tends to result in the extraction of a
relatively large number of factors, especially when the
number of variables is large .... In contrast, our own
analyses of self-rated mood ... have been geared ... to
clarify dominant dimensions.
In factor analysis these
are identifiable by the clear and discontinuous salience of the first few principal components or factors
relative to the subsequent ones (p. 220).
The last issue raised in this quote, that of the proper
criteria for factor extraction, was seen by Watson and
Tellegen as the primary reason that the broad structure of
affect had been overlooked for so long.
In the six studies that were reanalyzed, Watson and
Tellegen first reconstructed an approximation to the
original correlational matrix of items (in addition, they
used data from three of their own studies).

Each matrix

was then subjected to a principal factor analysis (or
Principal Axis factoring in SPSSX language).

Upon assess-

ing the percentage of common variance that was accounted
for by each factor, it became clear that there was a marked
''elbow" at the third factor in each solution.

Since they
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were assessing the dominant dimensions of affect, the
traditional Kaiser criterion was not employed and two
factors {the two above the "elbow" in the plot of the
variance accounted for) were extracted from each solution
and rotated to orthogonal simple structure by the Varimax
procedure.

In every solution the first two factors

accounted for between one half to three quarters of the
common variance.

Upon both a visual comparison across

factor solutions, and a quantitative analysis of factor
convergence, it was concluded that Positive and Negative
Affect were the dimensions being tapped in every case.
There were 36 factor convergence correlations between
Positive Affect factors across the studies {i.e., the
Positive Affect factors from each of the nine studies was
paired with the Positive Affect factors across the other
eight studies).

Out of these 36 congruence coefficients,

29 were above .90 and only one was below .80.

Negative

Affect fared less well, though still showing clear convergence.

Of the 36 intercorrelations, 19 were above .90 and

four were below .80.

With these results it could be seen

that despite the confusion and disagreement between studies
which assessed affect at the discrete, many-factor level,
there was a clear convergence across the reanalyzed studies
at the broad, two-factor level of analysis.
Based on the overall average loading for each of
the terms analyzed, Watson and Tellegen selected the terms
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presented in Figure 1 as those that most clearly define
each of the four dimensions of affect (Positive Affect,
Negative Affect, degree of Pleasure, and degree of Engagement) which can be represented in this two-factor space.
This positioning was accomplished by assigning "each term
to that region in which it fell in the majority of the
solutions in which it occurred" (p. 230; italics are
added).
Additional reanalyses were then conducted by Watson
and Tellegen (1985) on the oblique, many-factorial solutions originally found by several researchers (Lebo &
Nesselroade, 1978; McNair et al., 1971; Zevon & Tellegen,
1982).

For each of these studies a second order factor

analysis was completed using the procedure developed by
Hendrickson and White (1966).

In each case, two second

order factors were extracted and rotated to orthogonal
structure.

The terms that defined these second order

factors indicated they were clearly Positive and Negative
Affect dimensions.

The second order dimensions from each

study were then compared to the two dimensional reanalyzed
solutions.

In every case the factors between each solution

correlated between .920 and .999, which indicated quantitatively that Positive Affect and Negative Affect were clearly the dimensions emerging in each solution.

Finally, the

ten oblique factor scales from a study (Kotsch, Gerbing, &
Schwartz, 1982) employing Izard's Differential Emotions
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scale for Children (Izard, 1979: DES-III) were subjected to
a similar second order factor analysis.

Positive and

Negative Affect dimensions were again readily apparent,
despite the fact that disengaged states are not included on
the DES-III (i.e., terms reflecting fatigue and relaxation
which are considered excellent markers of low Positive
Affect and low Negative Affect, respectively).

Izard's

factor of Interest loaded highly on only the Positive
Affect factor.

"Enjoyment" loaded highly and positively on

Positive Affect and moderately but negatively on Negative
Affect.

"Surprise" loaded positively on both factors.

"Sadness" loaded negatively on Positive Affect and positively on Negative Affect.

The factors of "Anger",

"Disgust", "Contempt", "Fear", "Shame", and "Guilt" all
loaded on Negative Affect but not significantly on Positive
Affect.

These results are again consistent with the

placement of terms in Figure 1.
In describing the nature of Positive and Negative
Affect, Watson and Tellegen (1985) note that these factors
are descriptively bipolar but affectively, or experientially, they are unipolar dimensions.

This definition

emphasizes that it is only the high end of each dimension
which represents a state of emotional arousal (high
affective experience), while the low end of each dimension
reflects a "relative absence of affective involvement•• (p.
221).

Positive Affect (PA) is described (Watson & Clark,
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1984) as reflecting the extent to which a person is feeling
a zest for life or feeling up versus down.

High PA is

reflective of states of excitement, enthusiasm and activity, while low PA is seen by these authors as reflecting
states of fatigue and sleepiness.

On the other hand,

Negative Affect (NA) represents the degree to which a
person feels upset or unpleasantly aroused versus peaceful
(e.g. distressed, hostile and nervous on the high end
versus calm and relaxed on the low end).
Watson and Tellegen (1985) contend that since
Positive and Negative Affect represent the basic structure
of affect, states of pleasure and displeasure can be more
reliably interpreted as combined states of the independent
dimensions of PA and NA.

Pleasure and contentment are

states that reflect a mix of high PA and low NA, whereas
states of sadness and unhappiness are combinations of high
NA and low PA.
The relationship of pleasantness and unpleasantness
to PA and NA has produced some continued confusion in
analyzing affect structure.

The confusion referred to is

primarily one of semantics.

Many researchers describe the

affect terms they investigate as ''positive" affect and
"negative'' affect (e.g. Diener & Emmons, 1984; Diener &
Iran-Nejad, 1986; Diener, Larson, Levine, & Emmons, 1985;
Emmons & Diener, 1986; Larson & Diener, 1985).

However,

Diener and his colleagues have consistently studied terms
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like happy and contented as "positive" affect items, and
terms like unhappy and unpleasant as markers of "negative"
affect.

It is easy to see how this could happen because

"pleasantness" is easily seen as a "positive" affect and
"unpleasantness" is easily seen as a "negative" affect.
However, studies that assess what are true Pleasantness and
Unpleasantness factors (as outlined by Watson and Tellegen)
will not find the same factor independence or factor
properties that have been found with the factors of PA and
NA.

By looking at Figure 1 it can be seen that Pleasant-

ness and Unpleasantness should be opposite ends of the same
continuum, and not independent of each other, as they
represent a mix of PA and NA.

As such, the continued use

of the same terms ("positive" affect, "negative" affect) to·
describe different process (Pleasantness, Unpleasantness)
across studies, will unnecessarily continue to confuse this
area of the literature.
Using the structure of affect developed by Tellegen
and described above, Watson and Clark (1984) conducted a
massive review of the constructs in the literature which
assessed the trait they describe as Negative Affectivity
(unfortunately, the same systematic review of Positive
Affect constructs has yet to be conducted).

A full presen-

tation of the work done by Watson and Clark is beyond the
scope of the present review.
this review will be presented.

However, key findings from
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Describing their "trait" construct of Negative
Affectivity, which runs along the same dimension as their
"state" concept of Negative Affect, they report:
Taken together, the data reveal a dimension of stable
and pervasive individual differences in mood and selfconcept. High-NA individuals are more likely to report
distress, discomfort, and dissatisfaction over time and
regardless of the situation, even in the absence of any
overt or objective source of stress. As a result,
trait NA scales have a consistently strong relation
with state measures of anxiety and general negative
affect, even when the state scales are completed after
a lapse of several years. High-NA subjects are more
introspective and honest with themselves, dwelling
particularly on their failures and shortcomings. They
also tend to focus on the negative side of others and
the world in general. Consequently, they have a less
favorable view of self and other people and are less
satisfied with themselves and with life (p.483).
They then provide the further description of individuals
who are low on the trait of Negative Affectivity:
They are more content and satisfied with life and
eschew the ruthless honesty of high-NA individuals,
both with regard to self and others, in favor of
smoothing over life's rocky road. They focus on
themselves less and, when they do, are more pleased
with what they find, enabling them to maintain a
better mood, a more favorable self-view, perhaps to
the point of glossing over (repressing?) some harsh
truths.
Similarly, they have a more positive view
of others and, in the interest of smooth social
intercourse, are more conforming and conventional
(p. 484).
As evidence of this construct, Watson and Clark
have analyzed the intercorrelations between a large number
of published scales from the field of psychological
assessment.

They note, as did Millon (see the Intro-

duction), that each of these assessment measures have
dissimilar names and have distinct literatures built up
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around them, yet they are describing the same aspects of
people.

Watson and Clark contend that all these measures

intercorrelate so highly that they must be seen as manifestations of the same underlying construct.

Table 3 shows

the intercorrelations they obtained between the 12 most
highly convergent measures of the 18 measures they reviewed.

As can be seen from the table, measures of anxiety.and

neuroticism lie at the high end of this dimension and
contrast strongly with measures of social desirability and
repression, which are at the low end of this dimension.

To

obtain this index of convergence, Watson and Clark combed
the literature and averaged the intercorrelations observed
between the various measures in the table.

As mentioned

above, they considered these 12 measures, based on their
interrelationship, to be basically alternate measures of
the same construct.
After presenting the above evidence which showed
how well these constructs converge, the authors cited both
reliability and validity data for their construct of
Negative Affectivity. The validity data confirmed the
summary descriptions quoted above, while the reliability
data indicated that the trait of Negative Affectivity
remains stable for about six months

(~'s

between .80 and

.86), after which there is drop off in reliability.
However, even after one to two years the coefficients
remain at approximately .60.
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Table 3
Intercorrelations between the 12 measures that best define Negative Affectivity (Fran Watson & Clark, 1984}.
Scale
Scale

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

'.IMAS
A
PT
SD
R-S

1

2

82a
85

aab

88
-81

88

87
-86
87

ega
-81
74

-88

6. ER-Q

7. Sc
8. Pn
9. A-Trait
10. EPI-N
11. MPI-N
12. IPAT

3

73
71
73
72
72
74

77
72

82
74
81

4

8

10

9

11

12

a1a
87
-78
-76

62

44

7

-88

-60

81

6

5
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Note. Decimals have been anitted.

76
75
80
81
75
76
'!MAS

goa
73
42
76

82C
71
76

=Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale

(Taylor, 1953}; A =Anxiety (Welsh, 1956, 1965}; Pt = Psychasthenia
(McKinley & Hathaway, 1942}; SD = Social Desirability (Edwards, 1957}; R-S =
Repression-Sensitization (Byrne, 1961 ; Byrne, Barry, &

Nel~,

1963} ; ER-o =

Ego Resiliency-obvious (Block, 1965}; Sc = Schizophrenia (Hathaway, 1956};
Pn = Psychoneurosis (Block, cited in Dahlstran, Welsh, & Dahlstran, 1975};

A-Trait = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory A-Trait Scale (Spielberger et al. ,
1970}; EPI-N = Eysenck Personality Inventory Neuroticism Scale (Eysenck &

Eysenck, 1968}; MPI-N Maudsley Personality Inventory Neuroticism Scale
(Eysenck, 1962}; IPAT = IPAT Anxiety Scale (Krug, Scheier, & cattell, 1976}.

Clcoefficient alP'la or Kuder-Richardson estimate of internal consistency.
bsplit-half reliability. CP-arallel forms reliability.
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Further indications of Negative Affectivity can be
seen in a recent study by Tanaka-Matsumi and Kamoeka
(1986).

These authors administered 11 measures of depress-

ion, anxiety and social desirability to almost 400 subjects.

The measures that they used were: the Beck Depress-

ion Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh,
1961); the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (Zung, 1965);
the Lubin Depression Adjective Checklist - Form B (Lubin,
1967); the Zung Self-Rating Anxiety Scale (Zung, 1971); the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger,
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970); the Taylor Manifest Anxiety
Scale (Taylor, 1953); the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness
(Endler, Hunt & Rosenstein, 1962)'; the Edwards Social
Desirability Scale (Edwards, 1957); and the Marlowe-Crowne
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).

It can

be seen that many of these scales are the same as those
assessed by Watson and Clark (1984) and listed in Table 3.
Paralleling the findings of Watson and Clark, the later
study found that for all of the anxiety and depression
measures (except the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness, which
assesses anxiety in response to 14 specific anxiety
provoking situations), the convergent correlations between
similar measures were of the same high magnitude as the
divergent correlations across measures of anxiety and
depression.

That is, as measurable constructs, depression

and anxiety were not distinct entities.

In addition, the
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Edwards Social Desirability Scale was found to correlate
negatively and strongly with all of the anxiety and
depression measures (r's between

-.49 and

-.85).

This is

also consistent with the finding of Watson and Clark.
Additional support for viewing Negative Affectivity
as a unitary construct comes from a study by Meites,
Lovallo, & Pishkin (1980).

These authors reported that

measures of anxiety, depression, and neuroticism (using the
Beck Depression Inventory, the Zung Self-Rating Depression
Scale, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and the Neuroticism scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory [Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1975)) correlated so highly with each other that
they could not be considered assessments of distinct
constructs.
An additional source of evidence for the robust
nature of Positive and Negative Affect is found in a study
by Gotlib and Meyer (1986) who conducted a factor analysis
of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (Zuckerman &
Lubin, 1965; MAACL).

The MAACL was designed to provide

valid and differential measurement of anxiety, depression,
and hostility.

However, using 475 students as subjects, it

was found that two large dimensions emerged in a principal
components analysis.

The first factor defined all of the

negative affect items while the second factor contained all
of the positive affect items from the scale.

Once again,

depression, anxiety, and hostility were not differentiated.
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Watson and Clark (1984) discussed the similarity of
Negative Affectivity with the work done by Eysenck (e.g.
1981) on the dimension of Neuroticism.

However, they did

not equate their construct with his, even though neuroticism is one of the best measures of Negative Affectivity.
watson and Tellegen (1985) also noted the similarity
between the dimensions of Negative Affect and neuroticism,
as well as Positive Affect with extraversion.

However,

they did not equate their dimensions with Eysenck's
dimension.
As noted in the Introduction, it is the thesis of
the present study that the same dimensions of human
experience have been tapped twice - earlier by Eysenck in
factor analytic studies of personality, and currently by
Tellegen and his students in factor analytic studies of
emotions.

Consistent with this thesis, Plutchik (1980) has

cogently argued that emotions, especially one's general
moods, are nothing distinct from that which makes up
personality.

In other words, an individual's personality

character is indistinguishable from his or her emotional
character, when they are both assessed over the course of
time.
To examine the degree to which Watson and Tellegen
(1985) and Eysenck (1981) are assessing the same individual
differences, the results of a number of studies that have
explored the interface of personality and emotions will be
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discussed.

However, before this is done an overview of

Eysenck's extensive work on personality will be presented.

REVIEW OF PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS
Beginning in the 1950's Eysenck (1952, 1962) set

out on a long program of research to assess the dominant
dimensions of personality.

He originally identified two

independent dimensions of personality; one, the continuum
from introversion to extraversion (E), and the other, the
continuum from emotional stability to neuroticism (N).
Later, Eysenck (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) proposed a further
dimension of personality, psychoticism (P), which was
thought to reflect a predisposition to experience psychotic
behavior.

Additionally, in the last three versions of

Eysenck's measure of personality, a fourth scale has been
used (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968, 1975; Eysenck, Eysenck, &
Barrett, 1985).

The fourth scale was originally intended

as an indication of dissimulation, hence its designation as
the lie scale (L).

The L scale has subsequently been

interpreted as another stable dimension of personality (see
McCrea & Costa, 1985) that apparently reflects a naive view
of self and of one's interactions with others. There have
been conflicting reports over what the P scale measures
(see Claridge, 1981) with many reports indicating that it
taps a dimension of "toughmindedness" or sociopathic
tendencies, rather than psychotic behavior.

Since the
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latter two dimensions (P and L) are not of central concern
here, attention will be focused on the more concise and
well validated measures of E and N.
In an extensive review of the relevant literature,
Eysenck {1970) found support for conceptualizing personality in terms of the two broad dimensions of extraversion
and emotionality (which is what Eysenck and Eysenck [1975]
now prefer to call the neuroticism dimension).

Support for

these dimensions dates back to the fourth century B.C. when
Hippocrates discussed the four basic temperaments.

The

four temperament types - choleric, sanguine, melancholic,
and phlegmatic - were further described and elaborated upon
by Galen, Kant, and more recently by Wundt (see Eysenck,
1970, for a more complete discussion).

An examination of

Figure 2 reveals the connection between the four temperament types, and the two dimensions of E and N, for which
extensive factor analytic support has been found (see
Eysenck, 1981; Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1985).
In describing the phenotypic expression of these
dimensions of personality, Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) note:
The typical extravert is sociable, likes parties,
has many friends, needs to have people to talk to, and
does not like reading or studying by himself. He
craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks his neck
out, acts on the spur of the moment, and is generally
an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical
jokes, always has a ready answer, and generally likes
change: he is carefree, easy-going, optimistic, and
likes to 'laugh and be merry.' He prefers to keep
moving and doing things, tends to be aggressive and
lose his temper quickly; altogether his feelings are
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Figure 2. The structure of personality traits shadDJ the dimensions
of introversion-extraversion (horizontal) arxl neuroticism-stability
(vertical) arxl their relation to the four personality types proposed by
Jlippocrates, Galen, arxl Wurxit (see text for JOO:re canplete description).
FrCJ1l Eysenck arxl Eysenck ( 1975) .
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not kept under tight control, and he is not always a
reliable person.
The typical introvert is a quiet, retiring sort of
person, introspective, fond of books rather than
people; he is reserved and distant except to intimate
friends.
He tends to plan ahead, 'looks before he
leaps' and distrusts the impulse of the moment. He
does not like excitement, takes matters of everyday
life with proper seriousness, and likes a well ordered
mode of life. He keeps his feelings under close
control, seldom behaves in an aggressive manner, and
does not lose his temper easily. He is reliable,
somewhat pessimistic, and places great value on ethical
standards.
(W)e may describe the typical high N scorer as being
an anxious, worrying individual, moody and frequently
depressed. He is likely to sleep badly, and to suffer
from various psychosomatic disorders. He is overly
emotional, reacting too strongly to all sorts of
stimuli, and finds it difficult to get back on an even
keel after each emotionally arousing experience. His
strong emotional reactions interfere with his proper
adjustment, making him react in irrational, sometimes
rigid ways ... If the high N individual has to be
described in one word, one m1ght say that he is a
worrier; his main characteristic is a constant preoccupation with things that might go wrong, and a
strong emotional reaction of anxiety to these thoughts.
The stable individual, on the other hand, tends to
respond emotionally only slowly and generally weakly,
and to return to baseline quickly after emotional
arousal; he is usually calm, even-tempered, controlled
and unworried (p. 5).
Eysenck (1967, 1981) theorizes that the basis for
the above two dimensions of personality in large part
resides in individual differences in physiology.

According

to theory, the introversion-extraversion dimension is
predisposed by differences in the central nervous system
while the neuroticism-stability dimension is related to
differences in the lability of the autonomic nervous
system.

Briefly, introverts are seen as having a greater

resting level of cortical arousal than extroverts.

This is
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due to the greater amount of stimulation that is given to
the introvert by the reticular arousal system (RAS) of the
brain stem.

The RAS is an evolutionarily primitive compon-

ent of the nervous system and appears to act as a type of
relay and screening station for a wide assortment of
internal and external sources of stimulation.

Due to the

already high degree of stimulation received by the introverted person, they tend to shy away from further sources
of arousal and excitation.

Extraverted individuals, on the

other hand, tend to seek stimulation, variety, and social
excitation to achieve the same optimum level of cortical
stimulation as that already had by the introvert.
It is further theorized that the limbic system or
"visceral brain", which is the seat of emotional experience, differs across individuals in its tendency to become
activated, and is proposed as the basis for the Neuroticism
dimension of personality.

Highly emotional people (ie.

high N) have a more easily activated limbic system and are
therefore more emotionally labile than low N people.

Low N

people, on the other hand, are less likely to become
emotionally engaged across situations and more easily
return to baseline levels after an emotional arousal.

The

limbic system sits just above the RAS on the brainstem and
has excitatory neural connections to the RAS.

As a result,

when the limbic system becomes activated the RAS also
becomes more stimulated and, as a final result, there is a
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further increase in cortical activity.

In general then, in

addition to having greater emotional activation, high N
individuals respond to stimulation much like introverted
people because they have greater reticular arousal system
activation as well.

Conversely, low N individuals are less

likely to become emotionally engaged across a wide range of
situations and, correspondingly, they will respond to
stimulation on the basis of where they fall on the E
dimension of personality.
Research on these dimensions of personality have
shown them to be stable traits that remain constant over
time periods ranging from one to 50 years (Conley, 1985;
Giuganino & Hindley, 1982; Hindley & Giuganino, 1982;
Schuerger, Tait, & Tavernelli, 1982).

This consistency has

been observed in self report studies like those listed
above, and also in ratings done by significant others
(McCrea, 1982).

Additionally, it has been found that the

factor structure of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975, EPQ) is equivalent across a
diverse sample of 26 countries from all parts of the world
(Barrett & Eysenck, 1984; Eysenck, Barrett, & Eysenck,
1985; Eysenck, S.B.G. et al., 1986).
Extensive studies based on these factors of
personality have been carried out (in 1981 Eysenck reported
that over 5000 had been done).

Across studies significant

hypothesized differences have been observed in learning and
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memory (Eysenck, M.W., 1981), conditionability (Levey and
Martin, 1981), pain tolerance (Barnes, 1975), social
behavior (Wilson, 1981), and in physiology (Gale, 1983;
Robinson, 1982; Stelmack, 1981).
These two factors of personality are incorporated
into other prominent theories of personality (Guilford,
1975, cited in Campbell & Reynolds, 1984; McCrea & Costa,
1985) and emerge as second order factors from the 16
Personality Factor Questionnaire (Cattell, Eber, &
Tatsuoka, 1970, 16PF) and the California Personality
Inventory (see Loehlin, 1985).

In a recent factor analysis

of the scales on the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
(Millon, 1982; MCMI), Choca, Peterson, & Shanley (1986)
found that three factors emerged in a principal components
analysis.

Though interpretation of scales rather than

items is difficult (especially on the MCMI where an item
may be on more than one scale), the three factors were
reasonably interpreted as factors of introversion-extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism.
Perhaps most significantly, the factors of introversion-extraversion and emotionality-stability have a
higher genetic heritability than other personality traits
(Loehlin, 1985).

Almost all adoption, twin, and cross

generational studies of heredity note that these traits
have a heritability of about 50 percent (Fulker, 1981;
Loehlin, 1985; Young, Eaves & Eysenck, 1980).

In other
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words, about half of the phenotypic expression of these
traits appears to be due to genetic factors (although
Scarr, Webber, Weinberg, & Wittig, 1981, found heritability
coefficients to be about 25 percent).

It is clear then

that these dimensions of personality can be considered
robust, distal variables that fit Buss's (1984) criteria
for a true within-species individual difference.

REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND MOOD STUDIES WHICH CONVERGE
We turn now to a comparison of E and N with PA and
NA.

A visual comparison of Figure 1 with Figure 2, which

come from two separate bodies of literature separated in
time by more than ten years, shows a clear similarity among
constructs.

Additionally, a comparison between the verbal

descriptions given to extraversion and Positive Affect and
neuroticism and Negative Affect, as elaborated previously,
reveals a striking similarity between the two models.

It

may also be seen by looking again at Table 3 that neuroticism, as measured by two of Eysenck's early scales of this
dimension, are considered by Watson and Clark (1984) to be
excellent measures of their dimension of Negative Affectivity.

Negative Affectivity, it may be recalled, describes

trait aspects of the mood dimension of Negative Affect.
Further indications that PA and E and NA and N vary
together can be seen in the literature of well-being
(Diener, 1984), in the literature of social cognition where
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studies examining the influence of mood on cognitive
processing have been conducted, and in a number of less
easily classified studies.
Bradburn (1969) in the

U.s.,

and Harding (1982) in

Great Britain, report that negative affect, as measured by
the Bradburn well-being scale (which measures recent
positive and negative affect, see Appendix A), is higher in
women than in men; while scores for positive affect are
equivalent across the sexes.

The same phenomenon is found

with Eysenck's measures, as N is higher in women, while E
is equal for both sexes (see Eysenck S.B.G., et al., 1986).
In addition, it may be recalled that when Bradburn (1969)
first reported his results on psychological well-being,
positive affect was correlated with sociability and
experiences of novelty, while negative affect was associated with the number of worries people had, the intensity
with which they worried, the number of recent physical
symptoms they experienced, "psychological anxiety", and
reported concern over having a nervous breakdown.

Given

the descriptions of E and N above, these are just the types
of correlates that would be expected if negative affect was
related to neuroticism and positive affect was related to
extraversion.
Following this line of reasoning, researchers
(Costa & McCrea, 1980, 1984; Warr et al., 1983) have
assessed the personality dimensions of E and N in relation
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to measures of emotional and psychological well-being.
Using the Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn, 1969), they have
found that extraversion correlates strongly with positive
affect but not with negative affect, while neuroticism
correlates strongly with negative affect, but not with
positive affect.

Although Bradburn's measures of positive

and negative affect are not equivalent to the dimensions of
Positive and Negative Affect as proposed by Watson and
Tellegen (1984), they are similar.
The correlations in these studies have been
significant but not sufficiently high to warrant considering the E and PA dimensions and the N and NA dimensions as

equivalent to each other.

However, there are three factors

which may explain why the correlates were lower than what
would be expected if the thesis of this study was correct.
First, the Bradburn measure is only a ten item scale (five
questions for each type of affect), which may decrease its
efficacy as a reliable measure.

Second, and more impor-

tantly, the items on Bradburn's scales are not "pure"
markers of PA and NA as but forth by Watson and Tellegen.
Bradburn's items which assess positive affect are in fact
combinations of the Watson and Tellegen high PA and
Pleasantness items.

Similarly, Bradburn's negative affect

items are a combination of high NA and Displeasure items.
The third factor that may attenuate correlations, is that
the Bradburn measure asks for positive and negative affect
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over "the past few weeks".

This time frame, while tapping

general feeling states, may not give as stable an estimate
of general, or ''trait" mood, as a questionnaire that asked
specifically for people to report how they "generally"
feel.
Neuroticism has been shown to be a significant
predictor of mood states over time.

For example, Williams

(1981} found that N was more strongly related to subjects'
average mood over twelve days than to mood on any single
day.

Further, N accounted for 40% of the variance in

averaged depression states and 36.6% of the variance in
averaged tension/anxiety states.

Overall, subjects with

high neuroticism scores had poorer mood and showed greater
variation in mood pattern from one occasion to another,
than did more stable individuals.
In line with this research, Hill (1985} used a
Velten-type depressed mood induction procedure (Velten,
1968} to assess the influence of mood on personality.

In

the Velten procedure, subjects are given a list of approximately 50 statements and are asked to read them aloud while
attempting to enter into the mood created by the statements. In this study all of the mood statements were of a
depressive nature.

Hill found that high N individual were

more susceptible to the effects of this procedure (i.e.
they reported greater feelings of depression}.

TheE

dimension was not influenced differentially by this
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procedure, indicating that those individuals who are high
in N may be particularly subject to depressed or negative
mood states and that this is independent from introversionextraversion.
Boyle (1985), using a Velten mood induction
procedure, assessed the differential effects of mood
induction between premenstrual and non-premenstrual women.
Using Izard's Differential Emotions Scale (DES-IV), he
found that premenstrual women were more susceptible to the
effects of a depressed mood induction procedure than were
non-premenstrual women (N=154).

The only DES-IV scales

that significantly differentiated the two groups of women
were Sadness, Hostility, Fear, and Shame; which were all
shown above to load on the dimension of Negative Affect in
a second order factor analysis.
In the same area of research, and consistent with
the hypotheses of this study, it was found (Mohan & Chopra,
1986) that neuroticism scores also increased significantly
when women were in their premenstrual period as compared to
their postmenstrual period.
Isen (1984) has recently reviewed the literature
dealing with the influence of affect on behavior and
cognitive processes (i.e. social cognition).

She notes

that there is a difference between the results of studies
that have induced positive affect and those that have
induced negative affect.

She notes that part of this
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difference-may be due to subjects resorting to "pleasantness restorative" functions when negative affect is
induced.

That is, attempts at positive affect-like

behaviors or thoughts are used in order to change the
induced negative affective state or to eliminate the
unpleasantness that it brings.

Another possibility Isen

points out, is that there is increasing evidence that the
assumed symmetry between positive affect and negative
affect is an illusory result of semantics, and that in
reality positive and negative affect may be two distinct
processes.

These comments point out that researchers in

this field have been expecting positive and negative affect
to be opposite ends of the same continuum, and not making
use of recent models of affective experience (eg. Bradburn,
1969; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).

Despite this, a meaningful

comparison can still be made between studies of E and N and
studies that have assessed the effects of induced mood on
cognition and social behavior.
Positive affect has been induced in a variety of
ways and, despite the variety of procedures, the results of
these mood inductions on social behavior and on cognition
have been fairly consistent (see Isen, 1984, for a thorough
review of this literature).

It appears that induced

positive affect increases helping behavior, as long as
engaging in a behavior will not threaten this positive mood
or interfere with personal freedom and independence.

In
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addition, an induced good mood results in a greater
tendency for self reward, a greater preference for positive
self-relevant information and a general increase in
sociability and talkativeness.

In line with the hypotheses

of this study, these are the behaviors that are characteristic of an extraverted individual (see Wilson, 1981; or
Morris, 1979; for a review of the behavioral

~orrelates

of

extraversion).
Positive affect has also been shown to influence
cognitive processes.

In terms of memory, induced good

moods have resulted in subjects recalling positive trait
words or positive past experiences more frequently and/or
faster than control subjects (Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker,
Clark, & Karp, 1978; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979, Teasdale &
Russell, 1983).

In addition, subjects with induced

positive moods were more likely to rate ambiguous pictures
(scenes and faces) as more pleasant, had a lower tachistoscopic threshold for success related words, expressed
expectations of future success more, and rated their
household products as better than did controls.

Finally,

individuals with induced positive affect tended to rely on
simplifying (generalizing), intuitive or heuristic thought
styles in problem solving tasks (see Isen, 1984).
Similar to the results of induced positive affect,
Lishman (1972) found that subjects who were high in
extraversion recalled more positive material in a delayed
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incidental recall study.

He also found (1974) that high E

subjects recalled pleasant experiences faster than other
subjects.

Mayo (1983} extended this finding by showing

that high E subjects still recalled more pleasant memories
after current mood states were controlled for.

Graziano,

Feldesman, & Rahe (1985} found that individuals high in
extraversion rated faces from unknown individuals more
positively than did individuals low on this dimension.
Additionally, a number of authors have found that extroverts process information differently than introverts.
Introverts are more attentive to details and linear in
their thinking, learning best in a structure didactic
format, while extroverts tend to be more generalizing or
global in their approach to a problem and learn best in an
unstructured, informal teaching environment (see Morris,
1979; Riding & Dyer, 1980; Wilson, 1981}.

Thus, the

cognitive processing that occurs as one moves along the
extraversion dimension mirrors the cognitive processing one
finds during positive affect induction.
As mentioned above, the general picture that
emerges from studies that have induced negative affect is
less clear than the picture that emerges from studies which
induced positive affect.

A good number of studies have

shown that negative feeling states reduce helping behavior
or increase aggressive behavior.

However, a number of
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studies have also found the opposite effect or found no
effect at all.
Results of studies looking at neuroticism and
cognitive processing have been less ambiguous and more
consistent than those looking at negative affect and
cognition (Martin, 1985).

In light of the hypotheses of

this present study, it is important to discuss briefly why
results from negative affect induction procedures may
reasonably be different and less consistent than studies
examining N and cognitive processing.
Isen (1984) discussed how the field is attempting
to study "feelings" which are defined as pervasive and mild
affective states.

This focus is in contrast to studying

"emotions" which are conceived as being more intense,
specific and goal directed affective states (pp. 185 187).

It appears then that this field is attempting to

examine emotional "traits" rather than emotional "states".
This is an important distinction to make because it is very
likely that some individuals will be more responsive to
emotional induction procedures if the emotion being induced
is consistent with their particular emotional "traits".
other words, it is likely that in the above studies where
emotional states were induced, the emotional induction
procedure interacts with the general emotional level that
an individual brings to the experimental setting (i.e.
their degree of E or "trait" PA, and their degree of N or

In
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Negative Affectivity).

The mixed results found with the

induction of negative affect are then likely to be due to
"pleasantness restorative" functions.

However, if the

hypotheses of the present study are correct, it would be
predicted that the efforts to restore states of pleasant
emotions would only occur with individuals low on the
personality dimension of N.

Individuals high in neurotic-

ism are believed to experience more negative affect and, as
such, would not be averse to its induction (see Hill,
1985).

A similar phenomenon is hypothesized to occur with

PA induction along the E dimension.
If this framework and two factor model of personality/affect structure were adopted by researchers who are
attempting to assess the influence of mood on cognition and
behavior, greater clarity would likely be
results across studies.

ob~ained

in

That is, if one looked for

individual differences in emotional "traits" and then
designed studies with these groups in mind, greater
statistical power for finding group differences could be
had.

If this was done, the random heterogeneity of

respondents would not "wash-out" the effects of treatment
which are really there for some groups.
In the cognitive realm, research has confirmed that
people in a negative mood will rate ambiguous slides as
less pleasant, have lower tachistoscopic thresholds for
failure related words, have a more negative conception of
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others and have an increased expectation for aversive
events to occur, when compared to controls (see Isen,
1984).

Additionally, it has been shown that people with

induced negative affect are slower at recalling, or recall
fewer pleasant experiences (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979), and
manifest a greater recall of unpleasant or unhappy experiences (Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980).
In studies of neuroticism and cognitive processing,
Lishman (1974) found high N individuals to be slower at
recalling pleasant experiences.

In addition, he (Lloyd &

Lishman, 1975) found this to be the case with depressed
inpatients, even after the effects of current depressed
mood states, as measured by the Beck Depression Inventory
(Becket al., 1961; BDI) were partialed out.

Mayo (1983)

in a free recall of memories to stimulus words, also found
that high N individuals recalled fewer pleasant experiences
and more unpleasant or unhappy experiences.

This again was

the case even when the effects of current despondent and
anxious mood states were partialed out.
Similar to the above findings, Young & Martin
(1981) found in a recall task of self-relevant trait terms
from a word list, that increasing levels of N correlated
with a greater recall of negative self-relevant terms.
Martin, Ward, & Clark (1983) found that this type of
cognitive processing occurred only with self-relevant
information and was not the case when information was
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processed about others.

It was also found that others were

not necessarily seen in a more positive light, indicating
that high N individuals selectively process negative
information about the self and do not necessarily see the
world from a negative framework.
Thus, while there is not total agreement between
studies of negative affect induction and studies of
neuroticism, there is mounting evidence that these two
processes are tapping the same dimensions within people.
A further indication that N and NA are the same
constructs can be seen in a study by Wilkinson and Blackburn (1981; see Martin, 1985).

These authors found that

individuals high on neuroticism gave negative interpretations and non-self-attributions for positive events occurring, while they gave negative interpretations and selfattributions for the occurrence of negative events.

This

was the case even when the effects of current depressed
mood were partialed out.

However, more significantly, they

found that the same attributional relationships held when
neuroticism was partialed out of the current state of
depressed mood.

It then appears that both N and NA

contribute to, as well as sustain independently, a similar
attributional process (within, of course, the parameters of
the reliability and validity of the measurement instruments
used).
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There are internal validity threats inherent in
studies that look at the E and N dimensions of personality
as independent variables and then use the retrieval of
positive and negative life event memories as the dependent
measure of cognitive processing (i.e., Lishman, 1974; Lloyd
and Lishman, 1975; Mayo, 1983).

Because the Eysenck

Personality Questionnaire in many respects asks for
cognitions about one's life (i.e., "would you consider
yourself 'happy-go-lucky' .. , or "are you an irritable
person?"), there is a threat to causality due to the bidirectional nature of the correlational results.
there is really no way to say what causes what.

That is,
It could

be that high N causes a greater recall of negative life
events, but, just as likely, greater recall of negative
life events could cause high N (or, of course, there could
be a third moderator variable).

Fortunately, the method-

ology in this realm ·is sophisticated and diverse enough in
its dependent measures to indicate that N influences
cognitive processing independent of the above overlap (see
Martin, 1985) .
Table 4 summarizes the lines of convergence
discussed above.

By referring to Table 4, it can be seen

that, in general, the cognitive processing and the social
behavior that occurs after induced positive affect is very
similar to the cognitive processing and social behavior of
extraverted individuals.

Similarly, the cognitive process-
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Table 4.

Evidence for the congruence of Positive Affect

(PA) with extraversion (E) and of Negative Affect(NA) with
Neuroticism.

---------------------------------------------------------DESCRIPTIVE SIMILARITIES
N and NA
Higher in women.

E and PA

No sex differences.

Significantly correlated.

Significantly correlated.

NA is more easily induced
in high N individuals.
INTERACTIONS WITH A THIRD VARIABLEa
N and NA
E and PA
Greater induction of NA in
premenstrual women.

1 Greater helping behavior.

I
I Greater self reward.

N is higher in premenstrual 1
women.
I Greater sociability and
talkativeness.
I
Negative interpretations
I
and non-self-attributions I Greater recall of positive
for positive events.
I trait terms (faster and
I more frequent).
Negative interpretations
I
and self-attributions for I Ambiguous faces rated as
more pleasant.
negative events.
I
Slower recall of pleasant
life experiences.

I
I Simplifying or intuitive
thought style.
I
I

Greater recall of unpleasant!
or unhappy life events.
1

I

Note: reference sources for these statements are given in
the text. aAll statements are descriptive of behavior at
the high end of each dimension.
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ing that occurs when negative affect is induced, and
strategies to overcome this affect are not employed, is
very similar to the cognitive processing found with
individuals high in Neuroticism.

Thus, it appears that

positive affect and extraversion share a common source, as
do negative affect and neuroticism.

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Preliminary hypotheses
1)

Data will be collected from two campuses and

need to be pooled for analysis. As such, it is predicted
that extraversion and neuroticism scores on the EPQ will
not differ across campuses.

Confirmation of this hypothe-

ses allows for a pooled sample base without biases.
2)

The measures of personality (extraversion and

neuroticism scores from the EPQ; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975)
will be the only standardized and previously validated
measures this study will employ.

Since this is the case,

it is proposed that the obtained sample of subjects will
show scoring equivalent to normative samples (Eysenck,
S.B.G., et al., 1986) on theE and N scale of the EPQ
(Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975).

Nested within this hypothesis

is the expectation that females will show higher N scores
than males.
3)

It is hypothesized that a confirmatory factor

analysis of the extraversion and neuroticism items from
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Eysenck's measure of personality, will show a clear
differentiation and discrimination of the two proposed
dimensions.
4)

Using the model put forth by Watson and

Tellegen (1985), i t is hypothesized that a confirmatory
principal axes factor analysis (with R-sguares on the
diagonal and rotated to orthogonal structure) of the
"general" emotions questionnaire (explained fully below)
will show the dimensions they term PA and NA emerging as
the first two dominant dimensions.

That is, based on the

"elbow" seen in the plot of the eigen values, a two-factor
solution will be the most appropriate one.

Within this

two-factor solution High and Low Negative Affect terms will
load significantly on only one dimension and will be the
terms which define this dimension.

Additionally, the terms

of High and Low Positive Affect will load significantly
only on the other dimension and will be the terms which
define this dimension.

Terms of Unpleasantness, Disengage-

ment, Pleasantness, and Strong Engagement will show
significant loadings on both of the dimensions and will
fall in the appropriate quadrants within this two-dimensional space.
5)

The factor structure of self-rated emotion will

be the same, regardless of whether subjects are asked to
rate how they have felt in the past day (a state measure)
or i f they are asked to rate how they generally feel (a
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trait measure).

This hypothesis will be quantitatively

analyzed by correlating the factor loadings of emotional
terms across the "state" and "trait" response formats.

It

is expected that correlations near unity will be found for
both PA and NA.

Hypotheses of convergence
6)

Based on the hypothesis that NA is equivalent

to neuroticism, and consistent with earlier findings (Bradburn, 1969; Harding, 1982;), it is expected that the NA
scale will show a sex difference, with females reporting
significantly higher levels of NA than males.
7)

As a preliminary indication that PA and NA are

equivalent to E and N, respectively, a multitrait-multimethod matrix will be developed (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
Although both methods will be self-report, they differ in
the fact that the affect questionnaire is a Likert-type
rating scale in response to single affect terms, while the
EPQ employs a forced choice response format to descriptive
sentences.

It is expected that all of the convergent

validity correlations will be significant and their
magnitude will be higher than previous studies which
employed the Bradburn measure (Costa & McCrea, 1980, 1984;
Warr et al., 1983), because of the problems noted with that
particular measure.

The discriminant validity coefficients

are expected to be appropriately low (non-significant), and
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approximately equivalent in their magnitude between E and N
and between PA and NA (i.e. PA and NA are expected to
correlate to the same degree as E and N).
8)

As a final step, the NA and PA terms will be

combined with the N and E items in a confirmatory principal
axes factor analysis rotated to orthogonal structure.

As

it is expected from hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 6 that two
factors will emerge in each case, it is deemed appropriate
to use a confirmatory procedure for this last analysis.

As

we are concerned with the most dominant dimensions in this
analysis, the number of factors to be extracted will be
determined by the visual "elbow" seen in a plot of the
eigenvalues.

It is expected that this "eLbow" will

indicate a two-factor solution as the most appropriate
solution for characterizing the data at the broadest level
of analysis.

Within this two-factor solution the NA terms

of affect and the N items from the EPQ will load together
to define a single dimension.

The PA terms of affect and

the E items from the EPQ will also load together and will
define the other dimension in this solution.
Though not a strict hypothesis, a final prediction
can be made at this point.

Since the E and N dimensions

are conceptualized here as stable and "distal" variables,
it is expected that if there are discrepancies between the
hypothesized structure of the emotions questionnaire and
the observed structure of the emotions questionnaire, the
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inclusion of these distal variables will aid in interpreting the discrepancies.

In other words, it is expected that

the structure of E and N will help to clarify the dominant
dimensions of affect if the dimensions of affect that
emerge under hypothesis 4 are not exactly as Watson and
Tellegen have predicted.

Method
subjects and Procedures
Subjects were 231 undergraduates at Loyola University of Chicago (99 males, 121 females, and 11 who did not
indicate their gender).
study for course credit.

All subjects participated in this
However, participants were drawn

from two different campuses.

One hundred and twenty three

subjects were drawn from the Psychology Department's
subject pool at Loyola's Lake Shore Campus (LSC).

An

additional 98 subjects were recruited from psychology
classes at Loyola's Water Tower Campus (WTC).

The LSC has

both dormitory facilities and a commuter population of
students, while the WTC has no dormitory housing and all
students are commuters.
Students at the LSC were tested in small groups of
between four and 20 students.

They completed the Eysenck

Personality Questionnaire - Revised edition (Eysenck,
S.B.G., et al., 1985) and two emotion questionnaires based
on the work of Watson and Tellegen (1985).
will be discussed more fully below.

All measures

This packet of

questionnaires took students approximately 15 minutes to
complete.
Students at the WTC were tested differently.

These

students were assessed three times as part of a longitudinal study.

However, the data from the first assessment is

all that will be explored here.

Subjects from this campus
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were given the same packet of materials given students from
the LSC.

In addition, they were given a human figure

drawing test.

The drawings, again part of a different

study, came after the packet of personality and affect
materials and should not have affected the results in any
way.

Students were given all materials and asked to fill

them out at home in one sitting.

Subjects then returned

their packets of data to their class professor within two
weeks of when they were first received (although a good
portion returned them almost immediately).

Measures
Affect.

The emotion questionnaires used are displayed in

Appendix B.

The first 38 terms on each questionnaire are

the terms presented by Watson and Tellegen (1985) as the
terms that best mark each of the major dimensions of
affect.

Their order of presentation is random. ·However,

different forms of the questionnaires were not used to
counter position effects.

The last two terms on each

questionnaire (impulsive and anxious) were added by the
experimenter to see if they would fall between the dimensions of PA and NA, as would be expected by the thesis of
this study and the arguments of Gray (1981).

Gray, it may

be recalled, argues that the dominant dimensions of
personality are impulsivity and anxiety.

He proposes that

these dimensions fall at approximately 45 degree angles to
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Eysenck's dimensions of E and N.

Because their position in

a two dimensional affect space was not addressed by Watson
and Tellegen, these terms were not included in any of the
confirmatory factor analyses, and consequently their
position was not addressed in this research.

Further,

these terms were purposely placed at the end of the
questionnaire to prevent them biasing any of the other
terms.
The response format used in the emotions questionnaires was based on the work of Meddis (1972) and Russell
(1979).

The response options (very unlike me; unlike me;

like me; and very like me; scored 0, 1, 2, 3 respectively)
are symmetrical and do not leave open the possibility of
subjects replying that they cannot decide.

As was reported

earlier, this response format is less subject to bias than
other response formats.
The two emotion questionnaires in Appendix B were
given to all subjects.

One was termed a "General" emotions

questionnaire and the other was termed a "Current" emotions
questionnaire.

The only difference between these two

questionnaires was the way the introduction was worded.

On

the "General" questionnaire, subjects were asked to
indicate how they "generally feel" with regards to the
emotion terms presented, while on the "Current" questionnaire, subjects were asked to indicate how they had felt
"in the past day" with regards to the terms presented.

The
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"General" questionnaire was used as an index of "trait"
affect, while the "Current" questionnaire was used as a
"state" index.

Based on the Watson and Clark (1984)

concept of Negative Affectivity, it was thought that the
"trait" index would provide the best comparison measure for
extraversion and neuroticism.
Personality.

For assessing the personality traits of E and

N, the 100-item, forced choice Eysenck Personality Questionnaire- Revised version (Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1985;
EPQ-R) was used.

This measure is the most recent revision

by the Eysencks' for assessing the personality dimensions
of extraversion, neuroticism (emotionality), psychoticism
(toughmindedness- P), and lie (naivety- L).

The greatest

change in this scale from its predecessor, the Eysenck
Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; EPQ),
was in revisions made to the psychoticism scale.

The P

scale on the EPQ had a low reliability, a low range of
scoring and a very skewed distribution of scores.

The new

scale on the EPQ-R corrected these faults by taking out six
old P items and adding 13 new P items.

These changes are

not of great concern for the present study.

However, some

minor changes were made to the old Nand E scales as well.
On the EPQ-R scale of neuroticism, one additional item was
added: "When your temper rises do you find it difficult to
control?".

Thus, the new scale has 24 items rather than

the former 23.

The added N item does not appear to change
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the content of the scale much; however, the same may not be
able to be said for the extraversion scale.
Two new items were added to theE scale ("Have
people said that sometimes you act too rashly?" and

"Do

you often make decisions on the spur of the moment?"),
making it a 23 item scale.

These changes were not dis-

cussed by the authors (Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1985), but
it is apparent that the added items are impulsivity items.
Impulsivity had been a large component of the E scale in
the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968;
EPI), but had been removed, in large part, from theE scale
on the EPQ (see Rocklin & Revelle, 1981), leaving the EPQ E
scale as predominantly a measure of sociability and
activity.

There has been some debate as to whether

impulsivity should be considered a component of extraversion or a component of neuroticism (see McCrea & Costa,
1985).

However, a number of researchers have noted that

impulsivity, as a component of extraversion, was responsible for a number of the physiological correlates of
extraversion (see Rocklin & Revelle, 1981; Revelle,
Humphreys, Simon, & Gilliland, 1980).

It was not clear how

these two new items would affect the extraversion scale of
the EPQ-R, though it should make this scale more compatible
with results found by the E scale of the EPI.

However, it

would also probably function differently than the E scale
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on the EPQ - possibly by increasing the correlation between
E and N.
As a result of the uncertainty regarding the EPQ-R,
all results from this study were conducted with the EPQ's N
and E scales.

The E and N scale was formed by simply

dropping the items that were added to these scales in the
latest version (EPQ-R) of the personality scale.

RESULTS

PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
Across both student populations (campuses), there
were no significant differences on the EPQ extraversion and
neuroticism scales.

For the Lake Shore subjects the mean E

score was 14.67, while for the Water Tower subjects the
mean E score was 14.41 (!(218)= 0.44,

~=

.66).

For

neuroticism scores, the mean at the Lake Shore campus was
12.33, while at the Lewis Towers campus the mean N score
was 13.53 (!(218)= 1.65,

~=.101).

While the last statistic

indicates a trend for neuroticism scores to be higher at
the Lewis Towers campus, the difference does not appear
extreme enough to question the pooling of the sample data
from both campuses.

Additionally, even though there was a

statistically significant difference in the average age
between both campuses (mean at Lewis Towers = 20.36, range
from 16 to 41; mean at Lake Shore = 19.07, range from 18 to
34; t = 3.63,

~

< .001) the actual difference was slight

and was not considered great enough to prevent pooling the
data.

The age difference should not have been a factor in

the trend for N to be greater at the Lewis Towers Campus,
as N decreases with age (Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1986).
The mean extraversion and neuroticism scores from
this study were compared to the means that were found in a
non-quota sample of 879 American students (Eysenck, S.B.G.,
79
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et al., 1986).

This was as close to an appropriate

standardization sample as could be obtained, and the
average age for this population was 20.

Sexes were

analyzed separately and there were no significant differences among the two scales for females (sample mean for E =
14.62, SD = 4.57, standardization sample mean= 15.3, SD =
4.35, !(665)= 1.536, 2> .12; sample mean for N = 13.06, SD
= 5.63, standardization sample mean = 12.75, SD = 5.04,
~(665)=

.322, 2> .6).

For males there was no difference

between the sample and the standardization group in terms
of extraversion (sample mean= 14.59, SD = 4.17, standardization mean= 14.83, SD = 4.15,

~(429)=

.502, 2> .3).

However, there was a significant ·difference in neuroticism
scores; with the male sample subjects showing a significantly higher mean level of neuroticism (sample mean =
12.64, SD = 5.13, standardization sample = 10.55, SD =
5.41, !(429)= 3.385, 2< .001).
It was expected that females in the sample would
have shown significantly greater neuroticism scores than
males.

However, this was not the case.

The mean neurotic-

ism score for males was 12.64 and for females it was 13.06
(!(218)= .57, 2 =.57).

Apparently, because the males

scored significantly higher on this dimension than the
norm, the typical sex difference was not found.

As

expected, there was no difference between males and females
on extraversion scores for this sample (mean for males =
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14.59, mean for females= 14.62).

It is unclear why the

males in this sample had higher than normal levels of
neuroticism.

However, because of this finding, it was

deemed appropriate to assess whether the N scores combined
across both sexes were higher for this sample than for the
standardization sample.
sample was 12.87

(~

The overall mean N score for this

= 29.82) while for the standardization

sample the pooled N score was 11.9

(~

= 27.01).

This

resulted in a significant difference between both groups
(!(1099)= 2.41,

~<

.02).

It is unclear if or how this

result will affect the subsequent factor structure of the
EPQ.
To assess the factor structure of the EPQ, a
principal axes factor analysis was performed (with

R

squares on the diagonal) on all of the items from the E
scale of the EPQ and all of the items on the N scale of the
EPQ.

The first step in this analysis was an assessment of

a plot of the eigen values.

As can be seen in Figure 3, a

clear elbow formed at the third factor indicating that a
two factor solution was appropriate.

A two factor solution

accounted for 58.22% .of the common variance.

When this was

further broken down, the first factor accounted for 31.01%
of the common variance and the second factor accounted for
27.21% of the common variance.

The extraction of a third

factor would have resulted in a minimal increase

(6.3~%)

the amount of common variance that was explainable.

in
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Figure 3. Plot of the factors and corresponding eigenvalues in a principal factor analysis of the EPQ E and N
items.
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A Varimax rotation to simple structure was performed on the two factor solution.
in a clear discrimination of items.

This process resulted
By looking at Table 5,

it can be seen that all of the N items loaded most strongly
on the first factor, while all of the E items loaded most
strongly on the second factor, confirming the hypothesized
EPQ factor structure.
The next stage of this analysis was to conduct a
principal axes factor analysis of the emotion questionnaire.

However, before an adequate factor analysis of the

"general" emotions questionnaire could be performed, three
of the emotional terms had to be dropped.

These three

terms - dull, placid, and guiescent - were producing an
ill-conditioned correlation matrix, which is an indication
that subjects responded to these items inconsistently.
Significantly, while subjects were filling out the questionnaires, placid and guiescent were the only terms that
people were unsure of, and subjects frequently asked for
the definition of these terms (especially guiescent).

If

it is assumed that many subjects did not ask for clarification, yet were also confused by these terms, there is
fairly good evidence that these terms were often misunderstood.

The meaning of dull, on the other hand, was never

questioned.

This is reasonable, given its common usage.

However, the connotations to this term are certainly
variable (e.g. boring, unintelligent, blunted, and tired),
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Table 5. Loadings of Neuroticism {N) and extraversion (E)
items in a principal axes factor analysis of the EPQ
{Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975) rotated to Varimax simple
structure.

---------------------------------------------------------Factor 1 Factor 2
Item
Item
Factor 1
Factor 2
N6
N19
N7
N9
Nl
Nll
N14
N8
N10
N20
N2
N5
N16
N4
N21
N18
N13
N3
N17
N15
N22
N23
N12

. 63

.62
.62
.61
.56
.55
.54
.53
.52
.51
. 49
.48
.47
.46
.46
.45
.43
.41
.41
.41
.28

. 12
-.19
.10
-.18
-.03
-.14
-.12
-.18
-.01
-.18
. 04
-.12
.03
-.11
-.11
-.09
-.06
.15
-.17
-.21
.15

• 26

• 02

.12

.06

E13
E23
E21
E3
E6
E2
El2
Ell
E15
E4
E9
E22
E8
E5
E7
E20
E10
El
E18
El4
E17

-.11
.04
-.09
-.04
-.18
-.00
-.17
.06
.00
-.15
-.10
.01
-.00
.05
.04
.24
-.13
-.12
-.23
-.01
-.02

.66
.63

.62
.60
.59
.58
.55
.55
.53
.52
.46
.42
.41
.39
.35
.33
.30
.26
.24
.23
.09

{Note: the items are numbered by how they appear in the
EPQ-R [Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1985] and items that were
added to the E and N scale in this revised version have
been omitted from the analyses [eg. E16, E19, and N24].
All items have been coded positively.)
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which again is an indication that this term may have been
responded to inconsistently.
It is worth noting that each of the three terms
which caused confusion in this study were used infrequently
by other authors who examined affect structure.

Of the

nine studies that Watson and Tellegen (1985) reanalyzed
while developing the model shown in Figure 1, the term dull
was only used twice while the terms quiescent and placid
were only used in a single study.
With quiescent, placid, and dull, eliminated from
further analysis, the factor model proposed by Watson and
Tellegen was assessed in the present data.
In the principal factor analysis, a plot of the
eigen values again revealed a distinct "elbow" at the third
factor, indicating that the first two factors accounted for
the greatest proportion of explainable variance (see Figure
4).

Combined, the first two factors accounted for 64% of

the common variance.

When this was broken down, the first

factor accounted for 38.7% of the common variance, while
the second factor accounted for an additional 25.7% of the
common variance.
Following the traditional eigen-value-greater-thanone criteria for factor extraction would have resulted in
the extraction of eight small and unipolar factors.
Because of the small amount of common variance that could
be explained with these additional factors (e.g., the third
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Figure 4.
Plot of the factors and corresponding eigenvalues in a principle factor analysis of the trait emotions
questionnaire.
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factor only accounted for 5.2% of the common variance), and
because our focus is on the broadest dimensions of affective structure, this solution would have been inappropriate

tor present purposes.

Thus, the analysis proceeded with a

two factor solution.
A Varimax rotation to simple structure revealed the
factor loadings displayed in Table 6.

It can be seen that

the terms loading most strongly on factor 1 clearly defines
it as a dimension of negative affect.

Factor 2, on the

other hand, is strongly defined by positive affect terms.
The factor loadings given in Table 6 did not
exactly replicate the proposed factor structure put forth
by Watson and Tellegen, and call into question whether this
analysis actually confirmed their model.

Of the 35 affect

terms included in this analysis, 19 terms loaded exactly
where they were hypothesized to fall within this two
dimensional structure.

These terms were distressed,

fearful, hostile, jittery, nervous, scornful, elated,
enthusiastic, excited, peppy, strong, lonely, unhappy,
content, happy, pleased, satisfied, astonished, and
surprised.

Thus, it .can be seen that the terms which were

proposed to define high Negative Affect, Strong Engagement,
high Positive Affect, and Pleasantness all fell were they
were expected to.

Only seven of the 35 terms fell more

than 45 degrees from where they were hypothesized to fall.
These terms were sorry, drowsy, sleepy, sluggish, quiet,
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Table 6.
Terms and factor loadings on the two-factor
solution of "general" emotion terms proposed by Watson and
Tellegen (1985), rotated to Varimax simple structure and
listed by decreasing magnitude of loading.

----------------------------------------------------------FACTOR 1
FACTOR 2

TERMS

distressed
sad
blue
unhappy
lonely
sluggish
drowsy
grouchy
jittery
sorry
fearful
sleepy
nervous
hostile
scornful
relaxed
calm
still

.779
.753
.730
.710
.696
.648
.623
.606
.596
.587
.586
.569
.559
.539
.467
-.413
.353
.211

-.088
-.058
-.156
-.242
-.209
-.160
-.051
-.195
.044
.157
.003
-.063
.094
-.077
-.049
.339
.254
-.117

excited
elated
enthusiastic
happy
peppy
active
pleased
content
surprised
aroused
satisfied
warmhearted
strong
astonished
kindly
quiet
at rest

.078
.031
-.067
-.365
.031
-.293
-.349
-.443
.277
.168
-.411
-.100
-.117
.299
-.099
.255
-.065

.713
.647
.635
.625
.595
.594
.546
.529
.520
.520
.503
.420
.402
.324
.322
-.256
.251

Note: Loadings of .201 or greater are significant at the
.05 level, loadings of .234 or greater are significant at
the .01 level.
Both significance levels are Bonferron1
corrected to account for the large number of loadings
analyzed.
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still, and at rest.

It can be seen by a look at Figure 1

that, with the exception of sorry, all of these terms were
expected to define either low Positive Affect, low Negative
Affect, or Disengagement.
The apparent collapse of the low end of these
dimensions may have been, in part, due to the exclusion of
dull, placid, and guiescent - all of which are terms that
would have helped to define the low affect domains within
this model.

Watson and Tellegen (1985) indicate that it is

essential to include terms of low affective states in order
to obtain an adequate definition of mood structure.
Therefore, it is possible that the failure to replicate the
Watson and Tellegen model in this analysis was due to the
exclusion of the above terms.
Watson and Tellegen (1985) also note that it is
particularly important to include terms which denote
disengaged states in order to obtain the bipolar factors
which are expected to occur within a two factor solution.
It can be seen that both factors in the present analysis
were primarily unipolar rather than bipolar.

Again, it may

be that the results found in the present analysis suffer
because three of the eleven terms (27 percent) which denote
low affective states have been removed.
An additional area of concern, potentially related
to the collapse of the low ends of the dimensions discussed
above, is the

qu~stionable

differentiation of terms
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hypothesized to define Unpleasantness from terms hypothesized to define high Negative Affect.

As expected, unhappy

and lonely loaded significantly and positively on the
dimension of negative affect and significantly and negatively on the dimension of positive affect.

The terms

grouchy and blue showed a similar placement, though their
negative loadings on the positive affect dimension did not
reach statistical significance.

The term sad had a

negative, though nonsignificant and negligible, loading on
the positive affect dimension.

The term sorry also had a

nonsignificant loading on the dimension of positive affect,
however, it loaded positively on this dimension, which was
unexpected.
Given the ambiguities that were found in the
present results, it still needed to be determined if the
emergent positive and negative affect dimensions were
equivalent to the dimensions of Positive and Negative
Affect described by Watson and Tellegen.
In order to assess this question accurately, it
must be recalled that the model presented in Figure 1 is a
schematic representation of the proposed model.

The factor

structure that would correspond to Figure 1 has never been
found in any single study.

In fact, there is only one

published study (Zevon and Tellegen, 1982) which reported
factor loadings for each emotion term on the dimensions of
Positive and Negative Affect.

Unfortunately, this study
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used many terms which were not part of the proposed model,
and did not include all of the terms which were proposed to
define the model.

Despite these limitations, comparing the

factor structure found in this study with the factor
structure reported by Zevon and Tellegen would give a rough
quantitative assessment of similarity.
Using the procedure suggested by Rummel (1970), a
simple correlation of factor loadings across terms common
to both studies was conducted.

There were 18 terms from

the current study which overlapped with terms in the Zevon
and Tellegen (1982) study.

These terms were enthusiastic,

excited, strong, active, happy, warmhearted, sleepy,
sluggish, distressed, hostile, scornful, nervous,
sad, blue, lonely, content, and calm.

jittery,

It can be seen that

the overlapping terms included markers of high and low
Negative Affect, high and low Positive Affect, Unpleasantness, and Pleasantness.

The loadings of all 18 common

terms on the positive affect dimension across both studies
correlated .95.

The same correlation,

.95, was found

between both studies when all terms were correlated across
the dimension of negative affect.

Thus, despite the fact

that the results of the current analysis do not exactly
conform to the schematic model presented in Figure 1, it is
clear that factor 1 in the present study is essentially the
same as the dimension of Negative Affect in the Zevon and
Tellegen study.

Likewise, factor 2 in the current study is
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essentially the same as the dimension of Positive Affect in
the Zevon and Tellegen study.
Since both a "state" and "trait" questionnaire were
used to assess the emotions of each subject, a comparison
between each of these response conditions was deemed
appropriate.

If the factor structure was equivalent across

both questionnaires, it would provide additional support
for the validity of the factor structure listed in Table 6.
As such, it was expected that the correlation of factor
loadings across an orthogonal two-factor solution for trait
affect and an orthogonal two-factor solution for state
affect would be near unity.

In strong support of this

hypothesis, it was found that the loadings of all terms on
the dimensions of Positive Affect correlated .972 across
the two questionnaires.

The procedure for this analysis

was to correlate the factor loadings of all 35 terms on
both the dimension of Positive Affect from the trait
analysis and the dimension of Positive Affect from the
state analysis.

Using the same procedure, the loadings of

terms on the dimensions of Negative Affect showed a
slightly stronger correlation of .985 across the two
questionnaires.

Therefore, it appears clear that the two-

factor model is robust across both state and trait measures.
Further evidence of the robust nature of these two
dimensions can be seen by comparing the factors that
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emerged in the principal axes factor analysis with the
first two factors in a principal components analysis
rotated to orthogonal simple structure.

Because these two

procedures analyze the data through different processes,
convergence across both types of analyses would again argue
for the validity of the factors outlined above.

By using

the same correlational procedure described above, it was
found that the factor of Positive Affect (using the trait
questionnaire) from the principle axes analysis correlated
.999 with the Positive Affect factor (again trait) from the
principal components analysis.

In similar fashion, the

Negative Affect dimension from the principal axes analysis
correlated .9998 with the Negative Affect dimension from
the principal components analysis.
In summary then, even though the factors that
emerged in this analysis were not identical to the schematic diagram presented by Watson and Tellegen (1985),
there are several lines of evidence which indicate that the
observed factor structure is robust and stable.

In

addition, the dimensions of Positive and Negative Affect
found here are almost identical to the dimensions of
Positive and Negative Affect reported by Zevon and Tellegen
(1982).

Therefore, despite the fact that these results do

not exactly conform to the model put forth in Figure 1, the
resultant factor structure is a viable one.

An explanation

of why the present factor structure is the best two-factor
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description of emotional experience will be presented in
the Discussion.
Because the results found here provided substantial
support for the two factor model of affect, but only
partial support for the model proposed in Figure 1, there
was ambiguity over how to proceed with the two additional
hypotheses for which a scale of Positive Affect or Negative
Affect was necessary.

These two hypotheses involved the

assessment of Negative Affect across sexes, and the
development of a multitrait-multimethod matrix to assess
the convergence and discrimination of dimensions of affect
and personality.
development.

Four options were available for scale

The first option would have been to compose a

scale of all the terms in Figure 1 which were proposed to
define Positive and Negative Affect.

However, this was not

a viable option because it was seen earlier that the low
ends of each proposed dimension of affect did not emerge.
The second option was to develop a scale based solely on
the terms which emerged in the current analysis to define
each dimension.

This appeared to be a suitable option,

though the use of this procedure makes the eventual results
dependent upon the biases that may be inherent in the
current sample population.

A third option would have been

to develop scales of PA and NA that are based only upon the
terms that have been found in the current analysis to
define high PA and high NA.

This option would take into
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account the ambiguities and apparent difficulties with the
terms that are markers of low affective states.

Eleven of

the 12 terms which mark high PA and high NA in the Watson
and Tellegen model were found to define high PA and high NA
in the current analysis.

The only exception was the term

active which loaded significantly on both PA and NA; when
it was hypothesized to load significantly only on PA.

It

may have been that the term active loaded significantly on
NA because of an idiosyncracy in the present sample.

If

this were the case, the third option would not be a viable
one, especially since it could compound the errors that may
be present in the use of the second option.

To guard

against this possibility, a fourth and final option for
scale development, and one that could be used in combination with the second option, was to develop scales of PA
and NA by using the terms that define high PA and high NA
in Figure 1, without regard to where these terms place in
the current sample.
Given the above options to address the two remaining hypotheses which needed a scale of PA and NA for their
quantitative assessment, two different scales of each
dimension of affect were developed.

The first scale to

assess each dimension consisted of all terms that were
found to clearly define each dimension in the current
analyses.

These scales were termed PAl and NA1.

PAl was

composed of the terms elated, enthusiastic, excited, peppy,
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strong, aroused, warmhearted, kindly, and at rest.

NA1 was

composed of the terms distressed, fearful, hostile,
jittery, nervous, scornful, sad, blue, sluggish, drowsy,
grouchy, sorrY, sleepy and still.

The second scale to

assess each dimension consisted of the terms proposed by
watson and Tellegen to define the high ends of PA and NA.
These scales were termed PA2 and NA2.

PA2 was composed of

the terms elated, enthusiastic, excited, peppy, strong, and
active.

NA2 was composed of the terms distressed, fearful,

hostile, jittery, nervous, and scornful.

It was hoped that

the use of both scales would balance any potential biases
that may have been present in either the Watson and
Tellegen model or in the current sample.

CONVERGENT ANALYSES
It was initially hypothesized that NA, mirroring
neuroticism, would show a significant sex difference, with
females displaying higher levels of NA ..

However, since N

did not differ across sexes, it could be anticipated that
NA should also not show a significant difference across
sexes.

For the scale NA1 there was not a significant sex

difference (mean for males = 16.6, mean for females = 15.8,
!(218) = .87,

~

= .39).

Likewise, for the NA2 scale there

was not a significant sex difference (mean for males= 6.7,
mean for females= 6.22, !(218) = 1.01,

~

= .31).

Thus,

even though these results would not be consistent with
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expectations for a normative population, they are consistent with expectations for the current sample.
The multitrait-multimethod matrix is shown in Table
1.

It can be seen that there is evidence for both conver-

gent and discriminant validity.

As would be expected, the

affect scales, which share the same method of data collection as well as some of the same affect terms, show significant and very high convergence correlations (PAl with PA2,
NAl with NA2).

The other convergent correlations, which

use different methods of assessing the same construct, show
the significant and strong positive correlations that were
expected (E with the Positive Affect scales, N with the
Negative Affect scales).

Overall, it is clear that the

magnitude of the convergent correlations exceed the magnitude of the divergent measures of association by a large
margin.

The divergent validity coefficients are generally

nonsignificant, and all are negative.

It can be seen that

extraversion showed a significant and negative relationship
with the neuroticism and Negative Affect scales.

Ideally,

the Positive Affect scales would have shown the same
significant relationship as E across all of these divergent
measures.

The fact that the Positive Affect scales did not

show the same magnitude of relationship to N and NA as did
E may be solely the consequence of a PA being assessed by a
different methodology than E.

However, this may also be a

preliminary indication that PA, as measured here, is
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Table 7. The multitrait-multimethod correlation matrix of
summed scores on extraversion (E), neuroticism (N),
Positive Affect 1 (PAl), Positive Affect 2 (PA2), Negative
Affect 1 (NAl), and Negative Affect 2 (NA2). See text for
a description of the affect scales.

E

I
I
E
I
I
I
PAl I .57***
I
I
PA2 I .48***
I
I
N

1-.2o**

I
I

NAl 1-.22**

I
I

NA2 1-.30***

I

***

12. < .001
** 12. < .01
* 12. < • 05

PAl

PA2

N

NAl

.92***
-.13

-.08

-.09

-.05

.62***

-.18**

-.12

.66***

.91***

NA2
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somewhat distinct from extraversion, suggesting that the
dimensions of affect may have a greater independence from
each other than do the dimensions of personality.
Previously, the Bradburn scales have been used to
assess the degree of convergence between positive affect/extraversion and negative affect/neuroticism.

Several

reasons were pointed out earlier which explained why the
Bradburn measures have not shown the degree of convergence
with E and N that would be expected if the hypotheses of
this study were correct.

Among other reasons, it was noted

that the Bradburn scales of positive and negative affect
included assessments of Pleasantness and Displeasure, which
were believed to attenuate the expected high correlations
with extraversion and neuroticism.

As such, it was hypoth-

esized that the magnitude of convergence found in this
study would exceed the magnitude of convergence reported in
any of the previously published studies which assessed the
same convergence.

Table 8 displays the

co~vergence

meas-

ures found in the present study with previous studies, and
provides strong support for the expectations described
above.

It is clear that the present measures of Positive

Affect show a greater magnitude of association with extraversion than do the Bradburn measures of positive affect.
The same is true for Negative Affect as measured in the
present fashion, where the magnitude of association with
measures of neuroticism are clearly higher in the present
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Table 8. Comparison of measures of convergence between
Positive Affect and extraversion and Negative Affect and
neuroticism among the present study and previously published results.

Personality Measures
Affect Measures

E

N

E

N

Present Study
PAl

.57

-.13

NAl

-.22

.62

PA2

.48

-.08

NA2

-.30

.66

.20

-.13

Bradburn's
NA

-.03

.39

.45

Costa and
McCrea (1980)a
Bradburn's
PA
Costa and
McCrea (1984)b
Bradburn's
PA
Warr et al.

.36

-.15

Bradburn's
NA

-.15

.31

-.13

Bradburn's
NA

-.05

(1983)C

Bradburn's
PA

.51

acorrelations reported are the average correlation across
four times of testing between the Bradburn measures and the
E and N scales from the Eysenck Personality Inventory
(Eysenck and Eysenck, 1968).
bcorrelations are between the Bradburn measures and the E
and N scales of the Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness (NEO)
Inventory (McCrea and Costa, 1983).
ccorrelations are between the Bradburn measures and the E
and N scales from the EPQ (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975).
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study than in previous studies.

The comparatively high

degree of association found in the present analysis provides greater support than has ever been reported before
for conceptualizing PA and E and NA and N as two reflections of the same phenomenon.
The final and most important analysis for assessing
the central hypothesis of this study consisted of a principal factor analysis where the EPQ E and EPQ N items were
analyzed together with the Positive Affect and Negative
affect terms.

A plot of the eigen values again showed that

there was a clear elbow after the second factor (see Figure
5).

With this in mind, it was found that a two-factor

solution accounted for 41.27% of the common variance.
After a Varimax rotation, the first factor was found to
account for 23.8% of the common variance.

Conversely, the

second factor accounted for 17.47% of the common variance.
If a third factor was included in this solution it would
have only accounted for 5.55% of the common variance.
Table 9 shows the factor loadings to this two
factor solution.

Terms and items are shown in decreasing

magnitude of factor loading.

At first glance, it can be

seen that the orthogonal two factor solution showed a clean
break where all of the NA and N items loaded most strongly
on the first factor and all of the PA and E items loaded
most strongly on the second factor.

Thus, in terms of

individual differences at the most general level, it is
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Figure 5. Plot of the factors and corresponding eigenvalues in a principal factor analysis of the emotion terms
and the E and N items.
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Table 9. Factor loadings of Extraversion (E) items, Neuroticism (N) items, Positive Affect terms, and Negative Affect terms on the two factor solution to a principal factor
analysis.
Terms or items are listed in order of their
decreasing magnitude of loading and are rounded of to the
second decimal place.
Term or Item
distressed
sad
blue
unhappy
lonely
sluggish
nervous
jittery
N6
drowsy
grouchy
sorry
fearful
Nll
N20
sleepy
N14
N7
N19
N2
N8
N9
Nl
hostile
N15
NlO
N17
relaxed
content
scornful
N4
N13
N16
N18
N5
calm
N21
N3
N22
astonished
N23
at rest

Factor 1
.72***
.68***
.65***
.64***
.64***
.62***
.61***
.60***
.59***
.57***
.57***
.57***
.56***
.55***
.55***
.55***
.54***
.53***
.53***
.52***
.51***
.50***
.49***
.49***
.47***
.47***
.46***
-.44***
-.42***
.42***
.42***
.41***
.39***
.38***
.37***
-.37***
.36***
.34***
.25**
.25**
.22*
-.12

Factor 2
-.15
-.16
-.22*
-.26**
-.27**
-. 19
.01
-.05
.09
-.09
-.23*
.05
-.08
-.12
-.20
-.05
-.13
.15
-.11
.07
-.14
-.12
-.06
-.07
-.19
.06
-.12
.21*
.37***
-.10
-.18
-.08
.06
-.01
-.03
.18
-.03
.19
.13
.20
.05
•11
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Table 9 (cont.)
Term or Item
peppy
excited
enthusiastic
active
E3
E13
E23
E21
Ell
happy
aroused
E2
E6
quiet
elated
E15
E9
E12
E4
E22
pleased
strong
satisfied
E5
E8
ElO
surprised
warmhearted
still
El
E7
E20
E18
kindly
E14
E12
E17

Factor 1
.06
.07
-.04
-.26**
-.04
-.10
-.00
-.11
.02
-.36***
.16
-.01
-.21*
.17
.01
-.03
-.14
-.12
-.18
-.04
-.32***
-.09
-.38***
.02
.02
-.15
.20
-.09
.16
-.17
.01
.16
-.23*
-.06
-.05
.06
-.02

Factor 2
.66***
.65***
.64***
.62***
.59***
.59***
.55***
.55***
.52***
.51***
.49***
.48***
.48***
-.48***
.47***
.45***
.45***
.44***
.42***
.42***
.41***
.40***
.40***
.37***
.37***
.35***
.34***
.33***
-.32***
.30***
.30***
.29***
.23*
.21*
.20*
.07
.03

Note: The items are numbered by how they appear in the EPQR (Eysenck, et al., 1986) and items that were added to the
E and N scale in this revised version have been omitted
from the analyses (eg. E16, E19, and N24).
*** ~ < .001.
** ~ < .01.
* ~ < .05.
(All significance levels are Bonferroni corrected to reduce
the probability of Type I error.)
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indicated that the dimension of Negative Affect is equivalent to the dimension of neuroticism, while Positive Affect
is equivalent to the dimension of extraversion.

Figure 6 is a plot of the emotion terms and the E
and N items, and helps to clarify the results of the final
hypothesis.

The neuroticism items cluster with terms which

denote high Negative Affect and Unpleasantness.

As such

the personality construct of neuroticism incorporates emotional components of high Negative Affect and Unpleasantness.

However, it is the terms of high Negative Affect and

neuroticism which most cleanly define the vertical dimension in this solution and, therefore, as hypothesized, it
is high Negative Affect which is most intertwined with

neuroticism.

Extraversion can be seen to be a broader

construct than neuroticism (judging from the spread of item
loadings), and it incorporates emotional components of
Pleasantness and high Positive Affect.

However, it is the

extraversion items and the high Positive Affect terms which
most cleanly load on the second dimension, and, as hypothesized, it is they that serve to define the horizontal dimension within this solution.

Emotional terms of Strong

Engagement are components of both extraversion/high Positive Affect and neuroticism/high Negative Affect.

In like

fashion, emotional terms of Pleasantness were found to be a
combination of extraversion/high Positive Affect and low
neuroticism/low Negative Affect.
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Figure 6. Plot of the emotion terms and the EPQ E and N
items on the first two orthogonal dimensions from a
principal factor analysis.
• denotes an emotion term;
0 denotes an extraversion item; 0 denotes a neuroticism
item.
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By including the dimension of personality into the
analysis, the relationship between some of the emotional
terms was further clarified.

For example, while terms that

denote Unpleasantness continued to cluster with the dimension of neuroticism/Negative Affect, the terms grouchy and
blue now significantly loaded in a negative direction on
the extraversion/Positive Affect dimension.

Thus, the

Unpleasantness terms became more differentiated from the
high Negative Affect terms by the inclusion of the personality dimensions.

In addition, the terms relaxed and at

rest no longer loaded significantly on the dimension of
extraversion/Positive Affect, and it appeared more clear
that calm, relaxed, and at rest denoted pure states of low
neuroticism (stability)/low Negative Affect.

It can be

seen then that low Negative Affect and Unpleasantness in
the final analysis fall more in line with the Watson and
Tellegen model of affect.
It may reasonably be argued that the content
overlap between the EPQ items and the emotion terms
significantly altered the placement of emotion terms when
they were placed in the combined analysis, thereby invalidating the conclusion that was drawn above.

However, a

quantitative analysis of where the emotional terms were
placed on the two dimensions across both the combined
factor analysis (EPQ items and emotional terms) and the
individual factor analysis (only the "General" emotion
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questionnaire), showed that this was not the case.

It was

found that the correlation between factor loadings for each
of the 35 terms across both analyses correlated .997 on the
Negative Affect dimension, and .978 on the Positive Affect
dimension.

Thus, even though the factor structure was

clarified by the inclusion of the personality dimensions,
it was not distorted.
As an additional note, it is worth pointing out
that the emotion terms in both factor analyses tended to
cluster together rather than to spread themselves out
evenly across the two dimensional space.

This finding

argues against the theories which attempt to define
emotional structure on a circumplex model.

DISCUSSION

Results fr.om the present analysis supported the
major hypotheses of this study.

It was shown over a wide

range of emotional terms that the structure of mood at the
broadest level is best represented by two dimensions.
These two dimensions accounted for the majority of the
replicable variance and were clearly seen as dimensions of
Positive Affect and Negative Affect.

These two dimensions

of affect showed a high level of convergence with the
personality dimensions of extraversion and neuroticism
(respectively) when assessed in a multitrait-multimethod
matrix.

Finally, it was demonstrated through a factor

analysis which combined both the emotional terms and the
personality items that this convergence was due to the fact
that Positive Affect and extraversion define a common
dimension of individual differences, as do Negative Affect
and neuroticism.
While all of the major hypotheses received support
from the data, one unresolved issue at this point is the
fact that a number of emotional terms were in a position
that was significantly different from that which was
expected on the basis of the Watson and Tellegen model.

In

particular, the terms that were proposed to define low
Positive Affect (drowsy, sleepy, and sluggish, in addition
to dull which was not used in this analysis) and Disengage109
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ment (quiet and still, and guiescent which was also
excluded from this· analysis} did not fall in line with
hypotheses.
It could conceivably be argued that the number of
subjects for this analysis was less than ideal or that
there were idiosyncracies within the sample population (ie.
higher than expected neuroticism scores, especially for
males; the terms dull, placid, and guiescent needing to be
dropped} which caused the observed structure of affect to
differ from the hypothesized structure.

If these criti-

cisms were valid, it would limit the generalities that can
be drawn from the present study.

To counter these poten-

tial criticisms further evidence from other sources would
be needed if it was to be argued that the observed structure of affect is more correct than the hypothesized
structure of affect.
It was stated earlier that the N and E dimensions,
as distal variables, could help explain the emotional
structure that emerged in the present analysis if this
structure was not consistent with the Watson and Tellegen
model.

In order to explain the observed results, it is

necessary to examine more closely the dimensions of E and
N, as well as the evidence that Watson and Tellegen used
when determining the placement of emotional terms in their
model.

111

To begin, the loadings for the terms quiet and
still could not be assessed quantitatively between this
analysis and any other two-factor solution of emotional
space.

In the Watson and Tellegen (1985) study, factor

loadings across the nine reanalyzed studies were not
provided.

However, it was reported that still was a

significant marker of low Negative Affect in one study.
Quiet, on the other hand, was reported to be a significant
marker of low Positive Affect in two studies.

Quiescent,

the other term hypothesized to define Disengagement, was
reported to be a significant marker of low Negative Affect
in one study and a significant marker of low Positive
Affect in another study.

It is apparent then that the

placement of these terms as markers of Disengagement was
made with some ambiguity present, and may have reflected
the authors' best guess, given the available evidence.
However, i f evidence from the distal personality
dimensions of E and N is included, a different picture
emerges.

A look at Figure 2 reveals that Eysenck and

Eysenck (1975) had placed the label quiet at precisely the
place it was found in the current analysis (see Figure 6),
on the dimensions that are now seen to be extraversion/Positive Affect and neuroticism/Negative Affect.

In describ-

ing the dimension of extraversion, Eysenck and Eysenck
(1975) state that the "typical introvert (or low extraversion/low Positive Affect person) is a guiet, retiring sort
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of person, introspective, ... reserved ... does not like excitement ... keeps his feelings under close control .... (p.
5, italics added}."

Obviously the terms guiet and still

fit with this description more than the terms dull, drowsy,
sleepy, or sluggish.

In fact, one of the items from the

EPQ assesses this aspect of extraversion directly by asking
"Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?"

An

individual's extraversion score increases if this item is
answered "No".

In sum, the term guiet (and probably still}

would be expected to define low extraversion/low Positive
Affect when we turn to the E and N dimensions for clarification.
If the affective terms guiet and still can be
expected to define introversion/low Positive Affect, the
next question that needs to be addressed is where the terms
drowsy, sleepy, sluggish and dull should have been expected
to fall.

Returning to the nine studies reanalyzed by Wat-

son and Tellegen (1985} it was found that the term sluggish
significantly defined low Positive Affect in six studies,
sleepy defined low Positive Affect in five studies, drowsy
defined low Positive Affect in three studies, and dull
defined low Positive Affect in two studies.

These terms

were not found to significantly define any other dimension
across the nine studies.

However, it should also be noted

that the terms blue, sad, grouchy, sorry, and unhappy were
all also reported to define low Positive Affect (in up to
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five studies).

These latter terms, which were hypothesized

by Watson and Tellegen to be Unpleasantness terms, were
never reported to load significantly on high Negative
Affect, as would have been expected from their position in
Figure 1.

It is unclear why terms of Unpleasantness and

low Positive Affect showed the same pattern of placement
across the reanalyzed studies, yet were placed at different
positions in the final Watson and Tellegen model.
In the Zevon and Tellegen (1982)

~-type

factor

analysis, which is the only published study that included
factor loadings for terms of Positive and Negative Affect,
the terms sleepy and sluggish loaded on Positive Affect
(-.40 and -.50, respectively) which is consistent with
their placement.

However, they also showed a sizable

loading on Negative Affect (.23 and .30, respectively).
Thus, it appears that in at least one instance, these terms
showed a positive relationship with the neuroticism/Negative Affect dimension.

This is an indication that they may

have been reasonably placed in the Unpleasantness quadrant
of the Watson and Tellegen model.
Additional indications that these terms have a
significant association, and possibly their most important
association, with the neuroticism/Negative Affect dimension, comes from the descriptions of E and N.

It was

indicated above that these terms do not fit with the
picture that the Eysencks portray of the introvert.
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However, these terms do appear to describe the typical
neurotic or high emotional individual.
ual is characterized as one who

11

The high N individ-

is likely to sleep badly 11

(Eysenck and Eysenck, p. 5), presumably as he or she
anxiously worries about things done, or things that may go
wrong.

In fact, when an analysis of the EPQ N items was

conducted, it was found that several of the N items tap
directly into the emotional terms of drowsy, dull, sleepy,
and sluggish.
11

All of the following items, when answered

Yes 11 serve to increase the total neuroticism score:

you suffer from sleeplessness? 11

;

11

listless and tired for no reason? 11

11

no

Have you often felt
;

11

Are you sometimes

bubbling over with energy and sometimes very sluggish? 11
and,

11

no you often feel life is very dull?".

;

(The above

questions are denoted N13, N14, N22, and N15, respectively
in Table 9.)
Given this evidence, it appears that the inclusion
of these distal dimensions of personality has again served
to clarify the relationships that should be observed in a
two factor model of emotional structure.

Rather than

expecting these terms to reflect only low PA/introversion,
it appears clear that they should show a strong relationship to neuroticism/high NA - as they did in this analysis.
Following just the factor analysis of the terms on
the emotion questionnaire(s), it may have been concluded
that there were significant biases in the present sample of
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subjects, which in turn biased the results to the point
that they were not in line with the Watson and Tellegen
hypotheses.

In contrast to this conclusion, the descrip-

tive analysis given above, which extends the convergent
lines of research discussed earlier and builds upon the
results of the present factor analysis, shows that the
observed emotional structure is in fact a sensible and
meaningful one.

The work of Watson and Tellegen did much

to systematize mood research at the broad factor level, and
allowed for the conceptual connection with the E and N
dimensions of personality to be made.

This conceptual

connection was, in turn, another step in the process of
clarifying mood structure and helped to further clarify the
particulars of a two-factor model of emotional structure.
Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1984) recently
declared:
research is needed to explicate the meaning of
these basic mood factors ... to determine whether
Positive and Negative Affect reflect causally potent,
biologically based processes, or whether they are
merely descriptive summaries of the observed covariations among facial expressions and mood terms {p.
128).
The present research has responded to this call and has
found evidence that the dimensions of Positive and Negative
Affect reflect causally potent and biologically determined
forces, though by a much different route than has previously been taken.
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To summarize: all of the major hypotheses of this
study were confirmed.

First, it was again found that the

two dominant dimensions of affect in an orthogonal simple
structure factor analytic solution were Positive Affect and
Negative Affect.

Second, it was shown that PA and NA had a

stronger convergent relationship with extraversion and
neuroticism, respectively, than had been reported previously with Bradburn's measure of positive affect and
negative affect.

Third, it was revealed that the strong

convergence observed between the dimensions of PA and E and
NA and N was due to both the affect measures and the
personality measures tapping the same individual differences.

As discussed in the Introduction, the model of

affect put forth by Watson and Tellegen (1985) was "rediscovering" the dimensions previously outlined by Eysenck.
Finally, by employing the well validated and extensively
researched dimensions of E and N as distal variables, the
model of affective structure put forth by Watson and
Tellegen (1985) was further clarified.

It was shown that

the characteristic emotions of quiet and still disengagement are more fruitfully conceived of as moods that denote
low E/low PA; while characteristic feelings of sluggishness, drowsiness, and sleepiness are best seen as manifestations of high N/high NA.
The findings from this study are important because
they once again display the salience and prominence of
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these two particular dimensions of human nature, first
described by the Ancient Greeks.

Eysenck's dimensions of E

and N hardly need further experimental support for their
viability as broad and replicable individual differences.
However, it is encouraging to see that these same two
dimensions began to emerge from a discrete field of study
(that of affective structure) when there were no

~priori

hypotheses about their existence.
Of primary importance, this study made a conceptual
link which bridges the previously existing gap between the
literatures of affect and personality.

Researchers simp-

lify and bring clarity to their field of study through a
process of refining categories that represent phenomena in
the "real world".

One traditional distinction that has

been made in the study of adults is the distinction between
emotion and personality.

Personality is generally consid-

ered the long-standing and stable traits that make up a
person's character.

Emotions, on the other hand, are

generally considered variable and transient fluctuations in
character which are more responsive to external events than
personality.

This is a reasonable distinction to be made

and one that should continue to be made.

However, it is

important to be aware that these categories are simplifications imposed upon the "real world'' of experience.

For

example, research on children generally does not make the
same distinction between emotions and personality that
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research on adults does.

Rather, a child's character is

discussed as temperament, a term which merges the above
dichotomy, as temperament describes the long-standing
emotional responses which typify the child's interaction
with the world.
The current research indicates that the same merger
of concepts can be made for adults, as the broad dimensions
which give rise to the personality traits of E and N also
give rise to the emotional factors of Positive Affect and
Negative Affect.

This merger of concepts is obviously

easiest to make when a person's general, or trait, emotion
is examined.

At this level of analysis, one would be hard

pressed in an attempt to sort out what is "personality" and
what is a person's "typical mood".

However, it was also

shown in this study that the same emotional structure
emerged both under response conditions where subjects rated
their "general" emotional character and under response
conditions where subjects rated their recent, or "current"
emotional state.

The equivalence of structure under both

state and trait conditions can be seen as an indication
that there are two primary modes which organize, or
predispose, experiences to fall along a positive or
negative affective valence.
At the "state" level of analysis, experiences are
more variable and transient, yet still differ along these
two dimensions.

It is likely that at the "state" level of
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analysis one would not feel both the emotions of high
Positive Affect and high Negative Affect at the same time.
Thus, the dimensions would be less independent at this
level of analysis.
At the "trait" level of analysis, the two dimensions remain constant.

However, what changes at this level

is the percentage of time that a person spends at a
particular point on the two dimensions.

There is a

tendency for individuals to adopt a characteristic position
on each of these two dimensions, and this position is seen
by both their "general emotional traits" and by their
"personality".

Further, the trait position that is adopted

on each dimension is likely to be mediated by individual
differences in the reticular arousal system (for extraversion/Positive Affect) and the limbic system (for neuroticism/Negative Affect).

Additionally, at the "trait" level

of analysis, these dimensions would be expected to be
independent of each other (ie., whether or not a large
proportion of time is spent experiencing high Positive
Affect, says nothing about whether one also experiences a
large proportion of high Negative Affect).

SUMMARY

The psychological literature on affective structure, since its inception in the 1950's, has been characterized by confusion and disagreement over the number and
nature of factors that are basic to emotional experience.
Recently, however, a two-factor model of Positive and
Negative Affect has emerged in this literature which has
been repeatedly found to accurately describe the dimensions
of affect at the broadest level of analysis.

Despite the

advances that have been made with this model, the precise
delineation of emotional terms to define each of the two
independent dimensions (eg. Watson and Tellegen, 1985) was
believed to be incomplete.

Rather, it was believed that

the two-factor model of affect was "rediscovering" the
extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N) dimensions of personality detailed by Eysenck (1981), and if this hypothesis is
correct, it was believed that the personality dimensions of
E and N could further clarify the terms which should be

expected to define the dimensions of Positive and Negative
Affect.
The analysis of this contention proceeded by
several means.

First, many studies which assessed the

interface of mood and personality were systematically
organized.

Through this procedure it was shown that the

dimensions of Positive Affect and extraversion and Negative
120

121
Affect and neuroticism had similar patterns of influence on
other variables.

Second, it was hypothesized that, experi-

mentally, two dimensions, one of Positive Affect (PA) and
one of Negative Affect (NA), should emerge in a factor
analysis of 35 mood terms.

Additionally, it was predicted

that a scale of PA should show a high association with E
and little association with N and NA.

In like fashion, a

scale of NA was predicted to show a high association with N
and little association with E and PA.
Two hundred and thirty one subjects filled out a
questionnaire which assessed their general emotional
character, as well as the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire
(EPQ, Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975), which assess the dimen-

sions of E and N.

Both of these questionnaires were

factored by a principal factor analysis and it was found
that a two-factor solution accurately accounted for the
replicable variance within each analysis.

These two-factor

solutions were then rotated to orthogonal simple structure.
The E and N dimensions clearly emerged from the analysis of
the EPQ.

Additionally, a dimension of positive affect and

a dimension of negative affect clearly emerged from the
emotion questionnaire.

Even though these dimensions did

not exactly conform to the Watson and Tellegen model, they
were shown to be stable, robust, and replicable dimensions
of

Positive and Negative Affect.

By correlating all tour

scales (E, PA, N, NA) in a multitrait-multimethod matrix,
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it was found that there was a stronger convergence between
E and PA, and N and NA, than had ever been reported in the
literature previously.

Additionally, there was little

association across constructs, which indicated strong
divergent validity.
The next step in the analysis was to factor the
emotional terms and personality items together.

Since it

was argued that the two-dimensional structure of mood was
"rediscovering" the dimensions of E and N, it was predicted
that two large factors should emerge in this analysis, with
one factor defined by N items and NA terms and the other
factor defined by E items and PA terms.

An orthogonal two-

factor solution showed the expected pattern of results, and
supported the major hypothesis of the present study.
Finally, the salience of E and N, as distal variables (Scarr, 1985), helped to explain the precise terms
which should be expected to define a two-dimensional model
of affect.

It was argued that the Watson and Tellegen

model of affect was correct in its essentials, but erred in
the placement of a number of specific emotional terms.

In

particular, the use of the E and N dimensions clarified the
terms which denote low Positive Affect, as well as the
terms which denote Unpleasantness.
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Bradburn's (1969) Affect Balance Scale
(Note: items on the actual questionnaire were intermixed)
During the past few weeks did you ever feel .....
(Positive feelings:)
1.
2.
3.

Pleased about having accomplished something?
That things were going your way?
Proud because someone complimented you on
something you had done?
4. Particularly excited or interested in something?
5 .. On top of the world?
(Negative feelings:)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

So restless that you couldn't sit long in a chair?
Bored?
Depressed or very unhappy?
Very lonely or remote from other people?
Upset because someone criticized you?
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CODE · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Listed below are various ways that we all feel. This Questionnaire is si•ply
designed to see how you Q~~~~~l~ feel with regards to the terms listed below.
There are no "right" or "wrong" ways to feel, rather, we all experience
emotions in different ways and to different degrees.
Please rate as honestly
as possible the degree to which each of the following terms describes how you
Q~~~~~l~ feel.
To do this use the following scale.
0 = very unlike me (VUM)
1 =unlike me (UM)
2 = like me (LM)
3
very like me (VLM)
Please complete all of the items. Thank you.

1)

ca 1m

0

2

3

21) warmhearted

0

2

3

2)

dis~ressed

0

2

3

22) active

0

2

3

3) astonished

0

2

3

23) scornful

0

2

3

4) surprised

0

2

3

24)

0

2

3

5) elated

0

2

3

25) satisfied

0

2

3

6) quiet

0

2

3

26) hostile

0

2

3

7) unhappy

0

2

3

27) kindly

0

2

3

8) sluggish

0

2

3

28) enthusiastic

0

2

3

0

2

3

29) quiescent

0

2

3

0

2

3

30) drowsy

0

2

3

0

2

3

31) happy

0

2

3

0

2

3

32) content

0

2

3

13) fearful

0

2

3

33)

pleased

0

2

3

14) sorry

0

2

3

34)

sad

0

2

3

15) Jittery

0

2

3

35) placid

0

2

3

16) relaxed

0

2

3

36) sleepy

0

2

3

17) grouchy

0

2

3

37) blue

0

2

3

18) excited

0

2

3

38) strong

0

2

3

19) nervous

0

2

3

39) impulsive

0

2

3

20) peppy

0

2

3

40) anxious

0

9)
10)

at rest
aroused

11) dull
12)

s~ill

lonely

3
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CODE #

------------------

Listed below are various ways that we all feel. This questionnaire is simply
designed to see how you have felt i~-~b~-~~~~-q~ with regards to the terms
listed below.
There are no "right" or "wrong" ways to feel. rather. we all
experience emotions in different ways and to different degrees.
Please rate
as honestly as possible the degree to which each of the following terms
describes how you have felt_i~-~b~-~~~~-q~ feel.
To do this use the following scale.
0
very unlike me (VUM)
1 = unlike me (UM)
2
like me ( LM)
3
very like me (VLM)
Please complete all of the items. Thank you.

1) calm

0

2

3

21) warmhearted

0

2

3

2) distressed

0

2

3

22) active

0

2

3

3) astonished

0

2

3

23) scornful

0

2

3

4) surprised

0

2

3

24) lonely

0

2

3

5) elated

0

2

3

25) satisfied

0

2

3

6) quiet

0

2

3

26) host.i le

0

2

3

7) unhappy

0

2

3

27) kindly

0

2

3

8) sluggish

0

2

3

28) enthusiastic

0

2

3

9) at rest

0

2

3

29) quiescent

0

2

3

10) aroused

0

2

3

30) drowsy

0

2

3

11) dull

0

2

3

31) happy

0

2

3

12) still

0

2

3

32) content

0

2

3

13) fearful

0

2

3

33) pleased

0

2

3

14) sorry

0

2

3

34) sad

0

2

3

15) Jittery

0

2

3

35) placid

0

2

3

16) relaxed

0

2

3

36) sleepy

0

2

3

17) grouchy

0

2

37) blue

0

2

3

18) excited

0

2

3

38) strong

0

2

3

19) nervous

0

2

3

39) impulsive

0

2

3

20) peppy

0

2

3

40) anxious

0

2.

3
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